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One natural way to express preferences over items is to represent them in the form 
of pairwise comparisons, from which a model is learned in order to predict further 
preferences. In this setting, if an item a is preferred to the item b, then it is natural 
to consider that the preference still holds after multiplying both vectors by a positive 
scalar (e.g., 2a  2b). Such invariance to scaling is satisfied in maximum margin learning 
approaches for pairs of test vectors, but not for the preference input pairs, i.e., scaling the 
inputs in a different way could result in a different preference relation being learned. In 
addition to the scaling of preference inputs, maximum margin methods are also sensitive 
to the way used for normalizing (scaling) the features, which is an essential pre-processing 
phase for these methods. In this paper, we define and analyse more cautious preference 
relations that are invariant to the scaling of features, or preference inputs, or both 
simultaneously; this leads to computational methods for testing dominance with respect to 
the induced relations, and for generating optimal solutions (i.e., best items) among a set of 
alternatives. In our experiments, we compare the relations and their associated optimality 
sets based on their decisiveness, computation time and cardinality of the optimal set.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
There is a growing trend towards personalisation for services in many real-world application domains, such as e-
commerce, marketing, and entertainment. This involves capturing user preferences over alternative choices, e.g., products, 
movies and hotels. One may view this as an enhanced variation of supervised learning, known as preference learning, where 
instead of tagging an instance with a single label, preference relations are expressed over instances [1,2]. One natural way 
to express preferences over items is to represent them in the form of pairwise comparisons, stating that one alternative a is 
preferred over another one b, where an alternative is associated with a feature vector, i.e., a vector of values for a number 
of features.
An established approach for modelling preferences makes use of the concept of a utility function that is learned from 
preference input pairs. Then, for a pair of test vectors (α, β), this function assigns an abstract degree of utility to each test 
vector, implying which test vector is preferred to which [3]. Support Vector Machine (SVM) approaches [4–6] have inspired 
the development of several methods for learning the utility function, such as OrderSVM [7], SVOR [8] and SVMRank [9].
In a method such as SVMRank, when the utility function has been learned, rescaling a pair of test vectors makes no 
difference to the result, i.e., α is preferred to β if and only if rα is preferred to rβ for any strictly positive scale factor r. 
The same does not hold for the input pairs: different ways of scaling preference input pairs may lead to a very different 
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utility function being learned. However, it is arguable that in many contexts, a preference for a over b can be considered 
as conveying essentially equivalent information to a preference for ra over rb. For instance, knowing that the movie with 
the feature vector a is preferred to one with the feature vector b, we would often expect that 2a is preferred to 2b. This 
suggests defining a more cautious preference relation by saying that a test vector α is inputs-scaling-invariant preferred to β
if α is preferred to β for all choices of scalings of preference input pairs.
An analogous form of preference relation considers the scaling of features, where α is features-scaling-invariant preferred
to β if α is preferred to β for all choices of scalings of features. Part of the motivation for this is that for any SVM-based 
method is necessary to scale (normalize) features beforehand. This is because these methods are not invariant to the scale 
of their input feature spaces; for example, a particular feature with very large values, compared with the other features, 
might effectively veto the effect of other features on the objective function. Therefore, these methods are clearly sensitive to 
the way features are scaled [10,11]. The common practice for scaling is based on the properties of input instances [12–14]; 
as an example of a scaling method, the value of a feature is subtracted by the minimum of all values of that feature in 
the dataset and divided by the difference between the maximum and minimum. So, the scaling, and therefore the resulting 
preference relation, can sometimes depend strongly on precisely which preference inputs are received. There can thus be 
subjective, and even rather arbitrary, choices in the scaling of the feature spaces; different ways lead to different preference 
relations.
Taking into account both forms of rescaling mentioned above, we can also consider a still more cautious relation in 
which α is scaling-invariant preferred to β if it is preferred for all choices of scalings of features and preference input pairs 
simultaneously.
Other preference reasoning techniques based on a family of utility functions include e.g., [15,16]. Another technique 
instead of learning a utility function, is learning a binary preference relation that compares pairs of alternatives and de-
termines which one dominates which. Some early works of this form are considered in [17,18]. Other forms of preference 
inference that involves some predefined assumptions about the structure of the preference relation are based on more 
qualitative models [19], or lexicographic structure [20–23], or minimising regret [24–26], or additive independent family of 
methods [27–30], or GAI [31–33,25,26,34,35], or UTA [36–39], or Choquet integral [40–42]. Moreover, CP-nets [43] could be 
used to learn and represent more specific and customized assumptions; see e.g., [44].
We focus in this work on linear preference models. In particular, we can choose a vector w of weights, one weight for 
each feature, and consider the relation ≥w given by: α ≥w β if and only if w · α ≥ w · β , where w · α means ∑ni−1 w(i)αi , 
and α and β are n-dimensional feature vectors representing alternatives. The vector w is chosen so that ≥w is consistent 
with the preference inputs (which we assume are consistent themselves).
The consistency-based relation is given by: α is preferred to β if and only if it is preferred for all ≥w with w consistent 
with the preference inputs. This can lead to a rather weak relation, leading to relatively uninformative guidance for a 
decision maker. In contrast the maximum margin relation generates a total pre-order that is consistent with the preference 
inputs , by choosing a single vector w , which we call ω . This vector is chosen to maximise the degree of satisfaction 
with the preference inputs, corresponding to maximising the margin, similarly to SVM methods (for the case of consistent 
inputs).
Our novel preference relations are based on extending the maximum margin preference relation, by considering different 
forms of scaling. First we consider rescaling the preference inputs, generating a preference relation that is invariant to scaling 
up or down one or more of the preference inputs; for example, the preference relation does not change if we replace an 
input preference of α > β by 2α > 2β . This preference relation is constructed by considering all possible ways of rescaling 
the preference inputs , which leads to a set SI() of vectors w , and the associated preference relation I is given by: 
α I β if and only if α ≥w β for all w ∈ SI(). Each element of SI() corresponds to the maximum margin solution w
with respect some rescaling of the preference inputs. We derive a simple characterisation of this relation, which allows 
dominance to be efficiently checked.
We take a similar approach with rescaling the domains of the features. As mentioned above, a linear change of scale of 
any domain can significantly change the result for SVM methods and for the maximum margin preference relation. This is 
unfortunate because the choice of feature domains can be somewhat arbitrary. We modify the max-margin relation to form 
a relation F that is invariant with respect to rescaling of the feature domains. This relation can be expressed in terms 
of a set SF(), where α F β if and only if α ≥w β for all w ∈ SF(); essentially, each w in SF() corresponds with a 
max-margin solution based on rescaled domains. SF() is a more complex set than SI(), but we characterise it a number 
of ways, leading again to a computational technique for dominance with respect to the preference relation F .
Rescaling of preference inputs will almost always change the relation, i.e., we almost always have I different from ≥ω . 
However, for certain inputs  it can happen that F equals ≥ω , i.e., the rescaling of features makes no difference. We 
characterise these situations, and develop a computational approach for testing this, i.e., in which situations the max-margin 
preference relation is robust with respect to rescaling of feature domains.
The natural next step is to generate a more robust relation still, that is invariant to both these kinds of rescaling, of 
preference inputs and of feature domains. This is defined in a similar way to the two previous relations: α I,F β if and only 
if α ≥w β for all w ∈ SIF(), where each element of SIF() is the max-margin w for some rescaled version of the problem. 
Again, we characterise this dominance relation to enable computation.
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We examine the relationships between these relations, and analyse two natural ways of defining the best solutions 
among an input, with respect to each of these relations. As the relations are based on the assumption that the input pairs 
are consistent, we briefly discuss three possible approaches to generate a consistent preference input set.
Our experimental testing involves derivatives of two real databases; the experiments compare the different relations 
based on (a) the number of test pairs in which one dominates the other; (b) the number of optimal solutions found 
according to the defined optimality operators; and (c) the computation time.
Summary of contributions It is clearly important that the information in decision support systems is reliable and trustwor-
thy. Although SVM-based (maximum margin) approaches to learning preferences are attractive and well-founded, they can 
also be very sensitive to the form of the preference inputs. For instance, the choice of feature domains can be somewhat 
arbitrary, but can significantly affect the result. The paper considers different forms of robustness for preference learning; 
in particular, we developed three novel robust preference learning techniques; an approach that is invariant to the rescaling 
of the features’ domains; one that is invariant to rescaling of the input vectors; and a method that expresses both kinds of 
invariance. For each of these, we develop characterisations that lead to computational methods. We also have developed a 
computational approach for testing when maximum margin preference relation is invariant to feature domain rescaling. We 
analyse relationships between the different forms of preference relations, and, based on the computational characterisations, 
we implemented and tested them, comparing the relative numbers of optimal solutions, according to two natural kinds of 
optimality. We demonstrate that the methods are all different, and that they can be feasible computationally, and do not 
necessarily lead to large sets of optimal solutions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the terminology being used throughout the 
paper and explains two preliminary preference relations, namely the consistency-based relation and the maximum margin 
relation. Section 3 considers the effect of rescaling of preference input pairs, and characterises a preference relation that is 
invariant to the scaling of preference input pairs. Similarly, the two other relations, where features are rescaled and where 
both features and preference inputs are rescaled simultaneously, are characterised in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. We 
discuss three possible approaches to deal with inconsistencies in Section 6. The characterisations of relations lead to the 
computational methods in Section 7 for testing dominance with respect to the induced relations. In Section 8, we consider 
two kinds of optimality operator to choose a subset of alternatives as optimal solutions with regard to each preference 
approach. We report the experimental results in Section 9; Section 10 concludes, with a discussion of potential extensions. 
The appendix includes all the proofs of the formal results that are not included in the main body of the paper.
This work includes and extends work in two conference papers [45,46].
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we describe some notation and two preference relations that provide a basis for the following sections. 
Since there are inevitably many symbols and results to keep track of, Table 1 includes a glossary of symbols.
We assume that some user has told us that she prefers feature vector ai ∈ IRn over bi ∈ IRn , for each i ∈ I = {1, . . . ,m}. 
Each tuple ai or bi in IRn represents an alternative that is characterised by n features, with ai(k) being the score for alter-
native ai regarding the kth feature..1 By assuming a linear weighting model, each pair (ai, bi) expresses a linear restriction 
ai · w > bi · w on an unknown weight vector w ∈ IRn (the dot product ai · w is equal to ∑nj=1 ai( j)w( j)). This linear weight-
ing assumption is less restrictive than it sounds; for instance, we could form additional features representing e.g., pairwise 
products of the basic features, enabling a richer representation of the utility function.
We define , the preference inputs, to be {λi : i ∈ I}, where for each i, λi = ai − bi . Then, a feasible w satisfies λ · w > 0
for all λ ∈  (because ai · w > bi · w). Let us denote the feasible set by > (={w ∈ IRn : ∀λ ∈ , w · λ > 0}), and associate 
the hyperplane H w = {x ∈ IRn : x · w = 0} with a feasible w ∈ > . Clearly, any feasible hyperplane contains the origin, and 
all λ ∈  are in the associated positive open half-space of the hyperplane. We also will almost always be assuming that the 
preference inputs are consistent, so that > is non-empty. Later, in Section 6, we discuss how to cope with inconsistency 
in preference inputs.
We sum up some of these key notions in the following definition.
Definition 1 (> and consistent ). A set of preference inputs  is a (finite) subset of IRn . The feasible set > =
{w ∈ IRn : ∀λ ∈ , w · λ > 0} consists of all elements of IRn that are feasible (with respect to ). Set of preference inputs 
is said to be consistent if > = ∅.
Example 1. Suppose that n = 2 and let the preference inputs  be {(2,1), (1,2), (1,1)} (see Fig. 1(a)). Then, a feasible 
w ∈ IR2 satisfies these three conditions: (i) 2w(1) + w(2) > 0, (ii) w(1) + 2w(2) > 0 and (iii) w(1) + w(2) > 0. The feasible 
1 For ordinal features (e.g., a feature with {Cold, Mild, Hot} variables) each value can be replaced by a number, maintaining the order of values. For cate-
gorical features, one might use the one-hot encoding (a.k.a. 1-of-k coding scheme) to convert a feature with k categories to k Boolean features. For example 
a feature, that represents the type of car with values {Sedan, SUV, Hatchback}, is converted to three binary features: Is_Sedan, Is_SUV, and Is_Hatchback. 
Clearly, among these three features exactly one of them is true and the two others are false.
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Table 1
The glossary of symbols being used throughout the paper.
Symbol Meaning
n number of features.
m number of preference input pairs.
(ai ,bi) a preference input pair when ai has been preferred to bi .
I defined as {1, . . . ,m}; i.e., the index set for input pairs.
· the dot product, e.g., (2, 3) · (3, 1) = 9.
 is the (finite) set of preference inputs; i.e., {λi : ∀i ∈ I, λi = ai − bi}; e.g., the black points marked in Fig. 1(a).
> defined as {w ∈ IRn : ∀λ ∈ , w · λ > 0}; e.g., convex open space above and to the right of the dotted lines, in Fig. 1(b).
≥ defined as {w ∈ IRn : ∀λ ∈ , w · λ ≥ 1}; e.g., the union of the two shaded regions in Fig. 1(b).
∗ defined as {w ∈ IRn : ∀λ ∈ , w · λ ≥ 0}; e.g., the closed convex space surrounded by dotted lines in Fig. 1(b).
co() the smallest convex cone containing ; e.g., the darkly shaded region in Fig. 1(a).
C the consistency-based relation; i.e., α C β iff for all w ∈ > , w · (α − β) ≥ 0.
S − {x} from the set S , the element x is excluded.
∗ + {u} for the vector u ∈ IRn , defined as {w + u : w ∈ ∗}.
‖w‖ Euclidean norm of w .
ω the element with minimal norm in ≥; e.g., (0.5, 0.5) in Fig. 1(b).
mm the maximum margin preference relation; i.e., α mm β iff α · ω ≥ β · ω .
IR+ the set of strictly positive reals.
IRm+ the set of vectors u ∈ IRm with each component strictly positive.
t ∈ IRm+ , the rescaling vector for preference inputs.
t defined as {t(i)λi : ∀i ∈ I}, i.e., preference inputs being rescaled by t.
I the relation that is invariant to the rescaling of inputs; i.e., α I β iff for all t ∈ IRm+ , α mmt β .
SI() defined as {ωt : t ∈ (0,1]m}; e.g., the darkly shaded region in Fig. 1(b).
τ ∈ IRn+ , the rescaling vector for features.
τ−1 ∈ IRn+ , given by τ−1( j) = 1/τ ( j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.

 pointwise multiplication, e.g., (2, 3) 
 (3, 1) = (6, 3).
 
 τ defined as {λ 
 τ : ∀λ ∈ }, i.e., features being rescaled by τ .




SF() defined as {ω
τ 
 τ : τ ∈ IRn+}; e.g., the part of the line segment x + y = 1 strictly within the first quadrant in Fig. 1(b).
I,F the relation that is invariant to the rescaling of features and inputs simultaneously.
SIF() defined as {ωt
τ 
 τ : t ∈ (0,1]m, τ ∈ IRn+}; e.g., the part of the shaded regions that is strictly within the first quadrant (so not 



































Fig. 1. (a) The visual representation of Example 1 when  = {(2,1), (1,2), (1,1)}. If the element γ is in (i) the darkly shaded region; (ii) the first quadrant; 
(iii) all the shaded region; and (iv) the positive half space of x + y = 0 then γ will dominate 0 under relation (i) C; (ii) F and I,F (these two are 
equal in this example); (iii) I; and (iv) mm , respectively. (b) ω equals (0.5, 0.5) ≥ is the union of the two shaded regions, SIF() is the part of ≥
that is strictly within the first quadrant (so not including the axes), SF() is the part of the line segment x + y = 1 strictly within the first quadrant, and 
SI() is the darkly shaded region, which is the intersection of ≥ with co(), which is the dark region in the left-hand figure.
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set, > , is shown in Fig. 1(b) as the convex open space above and to the right of the dotted lines, which is also shown as 
the union of the shaded regions (excluding its boundary) in Fig. 1(a). In Fig. 1(a), the dotted line (x + y = 0) is a feasible 
hyperplane since it could be associated with a feasible point, such as (0.5, 0.5).
2.1. Consistency based relation
One natural preference relation, C , which has been explored, for example, in [47], is given as follows: the test vector α
is consistency-based preferred to β (α C β) if and only if w · α ≥ w · β for all feasible w ∈ > . This means that dominance 
of α over β is consistent with the fact that for all i ∈ I , ai has dominated bi .
Proposition 1 below states two other alternative ways to determine if α C β (just consider γ = α − β). We recall the 
definition of > and define for any finite  ⊆ IRn , the following three sets:
• > = {w ∈ IRn : ∀λ ∈ , w · λ > 0};
• ≥ = {w ∈ IRn : ∀λ ∈ , w · λ ≥ 1} (≥ is the union of the two shaded regions in Fig. 1(b)); and
• ∗ = {w ∈ IRn : ∀λ ∈ , w · λ ≥ 0} (the closed convex space surrounded by dotted lines in Fig. 1(b));
• co(), the convex cone generated by , is the smallest convex cone containing  (this is the darkly shaded region in 
Fig. 1(a)); i.e., the set of all vectors in IRn that can be written as 
∑
λ∈ rλλ, where rλ are arbitrary non-negative reals. 
Elements of co() are said to be positive linear combinations of elements of .
Proposition 1. Consider any finite  ⊆ IRn that is consistent (i.e., > = ∅) and consider any γ ∈ IRn. Then, the following conditions 
are equivalent. Thus, any of these are equivalent to γ C 0.
(i) for all w ∈ > , w · γ ≥ 0.
(ii) for all w ∈ ≥ , w · γ ≥ 0.
(iii) γ ∈ co().
2.2. Maximum margin preference relation
The maximum margin preference is based on the principal idea in conventional SVM for the hard margin case (see 
Section 2.3 of [5] and Section 2 of [6])2; This involves picking a unique element w in the feasible set, to generate the 
preference relation ≥w given by α ≥w β ⇐⇒ w · α ≥ w · β (leading to a stronger ordering than C).
As mentioned above, w is said to be feasible if w · λ > 0 for all λ in the set of preference inputs . We can also 
consider degrees of feasibility or satisfaction: one might consider w · λ as a measure of the degree to which w satisfies 
λ. However, for our purposes, vector w is equivalent with any scalar multiple of w , such as 2w , so we want the degree 
of satisfaction not to be affected by scalar multiplication of w . For this reason, we define the degree DegSat(w; λ) that w
satisfies λ to be w‖w‖ · λ. The margin marg(w) is then defined as the minimal degree of satisfaction over all elements of , 
i.e., marg(w) = minλ∈ DegSat(w; λ) = minλ∈ w·λ‖w‖ . Note that marg(w) > 0 if and only if w is feasible, i.e., w ∈ > , and 
that for any real r > 0, marg(rw) = marg(w).
It is natural to choose w that maximises the margin, since it is, in a certain sense, maximally consistent with the 
preference inputs, i.e., it maximises the degree of satisfaction. The margin marg(w) is equal to the perpendicular distance 
between the hyperplane H w and the closest element of  to H w . In simple terms, maximising the margin means choosing 
a feasible hyperplane that is as far as possible from . The hyperplane that produces the maximum margin is equal to 
the hyperplane H w where w uniquely has the minimum (Euclidean) norm in ≥ , as stated in Theorem 2. We denote 
the unique element of ≥ with the minimum norm by ω . In Fig. 1(b), (0.5, 0.5) has uniquely minimal norm in ≥ , so 
ω = (0.5, 0.5), and thus, the associated hyperplane for that point, x + y = 0 in Fig. 1(a), has the maximum margin. We use ‖w‖ as the notation for Euclidean norm in this paper.
Theorem 2. Let  ⊆ IRn be a finite consistent set of preference inputs, so that > is non-empty. Then the following all hold.
(i) ≥ is non-empty;
(ii) there exists a unique element ω in 
≥ with minimum norm;
(iii) w maximises marg within > if and only if w is a strictly positive scalar multiple of ω, i.e., there exists r ∈ IR with r > 0 such 
that w = rω .
More general versions of this result that allow additional linear restrictions on the feasible set > are given in [48,49].
2 It also corresponds to a hard margin version of Ranking SVM [9]; in particular, when the slack variables are omitted or set to zero; this also corresponds, 
roughly speaking, to tending the penalising constant C in the objective function (Equation 12 of [9]) to infinity..
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Theorem 2 allows the following definition of the max-margin preference relation mm , and also implies that α mm β
if and only if w · α ≥ w · β for any w maximising the margin, i.e., with maximum degree of satisfaction of the preference 
inputs.
Definition 2 (mm ). For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn we define relation mm by, for α, β ∈ IRn , α is 
max-margin-preferred to β with respect to  (i.e., α mm β) if and only if α · ω ≥ β · ω , where ω has uniquely minimal 
norm in ≥ .
The relation mm is a total pre-order, since it is transitive and for any α, β ∈ IRn we have α mm β or β mm α (or both). 
Considering  as in Example 1, ω = (1/2, 1/2), and {(1/2, 1/2)}∗ = {(x, y) : x + y ≥ 0}; so, for all γ in the positive half-space 
of x + y = 0, γ mm 0.
2.3. Overall view of rescaling methods
Here we give an overall view of the rescaling approaches developed in the next three sections, Sections 3, 4 and 5. Recall 
that we are ideally trying to pick an element w of the feasible set > , since for any w ∈ > , the associated relation ≥w , 
given by α ≥w β ⇐⇒ α · w ≥ β · w , is then consistent with the preference inputs . Note that if we multiply w by a 
positive constant r > 0, this does not change the relation, i.e., the relation ≥rw is equal to the relation ≥w . This implies that 
we do not lose anything if we focus on the subset ≥ of the feasible set > (since they generate the same set of relations 
≥w ).
As discussed in the previous subsection, the max-margin preference relation (see Definition 2) chooses the element ω
with minimum norm in ≥ , leading to the associated relation mm equalling ≥ω . The effect of different kinds of rescaling 
leads us to consider different elements of ≥ , each with an associated subset S of ≥; we call S , the set of scenarios. We 
then consider preferences that hold for each element of S; thus, the associated preference relation S is given by α S β
if and only if for all w ∈ S , α · w ≥ β · w . Equivalently, relation S is equal to ⋂w∈S ≥w . In the next few paragraphs we 
discuss different choices for the set of scenarios S .
Max-margin case Regarding the maximum margin preference relation from Section 2.2, mm involves just a single scenario, 
ω , the element of 
≥ with minimum norm, which uniquely maximises the margin. Recall, α is max-margin-preferred to 
β if and only if α ≥ω β .
Consistency-based For the consistency-based relation C in Section 2.1 we have the set of scenarios S as the whole of ≥ . 
Thus, C is the same as ≥ .
Rescaling input preferences Rescaling a preference input, λ ∈ , means replacing λ by tλλ, where tλ is a strictly positive 
real, as discussed in Section 3. So, when we rescale the preference inputs, we obtain a new version t of , which has a 
corresponding element ωt maximising the margin in the transformed problem. We let S = SI(), the set of all such ωt , 
leading to relation I that is invariant to the rescaling of inputs. We have that α I β if and only if α is max-margin-
preferred to β over all rescalings of preference inputs. SI() is the darkly shaded region in Fig. 1(b).
Rescaling of features A rescaling of the features’ domains (as considered in Section 4) amounts to a scaling of each co-
ordinate, and thus is associated with a vector τ in IRn with strictly positive values; e.g., doubling the value of the first 
feature and leaving the rest unchanged, leads to the rescaling vector τ being (2, 1, 1, . . . , 1). This transformation affects both 
the preference inputs , and arbitrary feature vectors, such as α and β . We can then consider the max-margin relation in 
the transformed space. The features-scaling-invariant preference relation F is given by α F β if and only if α is max-
margin-preferred to β over all rescalings τ of features. The set S of scenarios in this case is equal to the set of what we 
call the rescale-optimal elements of ≥ , which are those elements that have minimum rescaled norm for some rescaling τ . 
The set of rescale-optimal elements is SF(), which equals the part of the line segment x + y = 1 strictly within the first 
quadrant in Fig. 1(b).
Rescaling of both inputs and features In Section 5 we consider both rescaling of the preference inputs and of the features’ 
domains. α I,F β if and only if for all rescalings of the features and the preference inputs, α is max-margin preferred to β . 
This is if and only if α ≥w β for all w in the associated set of scenarios SIF(), where the latter set consists of all ways of 
transforming ω by inputs and features rescaling. In Fig. 1(b), SIF() is the part of the shaded regions that is strictly within 
the first quadrant.
For each of these sets S of scenarios, we have that α S β if and only if there exists some w ∈ S , such that (β−α) · w > 0. 
As shown in Proposition 1 in Section 2.1, for the case of the consistency-based relation C , the simple structure of S = ≥
leads to a simple formulation for testing α S β that can be solved using linear programming.
However, for the sets of scenarios, SI(), SF() and SIF(), computation of the associated dominance relations I , F
and I,F is not straight-forward, because of the more complex definitions. Most of the technical work in Sections 3, 4 and 5
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Fig. 2. Some rescalings of inputs and features on  = {(2, 1), (1, 2), (1, 1)} are illustrated. (a) ≥t is the union of the two shaded regions when inputs 
are rescaled by t = (3/5, 1/5, 1). The darkly shaded region indicates ≥t′ where t′ = (1/4, 1/5, 1/3). We have ωt = ωt′ = (1, 2). The darkly shaded region 
is also equal to ∗ + {(1, 2)} (see Example 2 in Section 3.1). (b) The shaded region indicates ( 
 τ )≥ when features are rescaled by τ = (2, 3). Here, 
ω
τ = (2/13, 3/13) (see Example 3 in Section 4).
is concerned with giving characterisations of the associated sets of scenarios (as constraints involving additional variables) 
that enable computation of the dominance relations.
3. Rescaling of preference inputs
As discussed in the introduction, a plausible robustness requirement is that a preference relation should not depend on 
how the preference inputs are scaled. If the user tells us that they prefer α to β , we might expect that this would mean 
that they would also prefer 0.5α over 0.5β , since we are assuming a linear model. However, if we add this preference, 
corresponding to 0.5(α − β), to the preference input set, we may well obtain a different preference relation for the max-
margin preference relation; similarly if we replace the original preference α − β with this rescaled version 0.5(α − β). In 
this section we define and give a characterisation of a preference relation I that is invariant to rescaling of the preference 
inputs .
3.1. Defining inputs-rescaling-invariant relation
Consider the effect of rescaling the preference inputs  by t ∈ IRm+ (where IRm+ is the set of strictly positive reals in 
m-dimensional), with each preference input being multiplied by a strictly positive scalar, so that the rescaled preference 
input set is defined as t = {t(i)λi : i ∈ I}. We then have (t)≥ = ≥t = {w ∈ IRn : ∀i ∈ I, w · (t(i)λi) ≥ 1}. We will write t(i)
as ti for brevity. Note that (t)> = > for any t ∈ IRm+ , since w · tiλi > 0 ⇐⇒ w · λi > 0, so if  is consistent then so is 
t for every t ∈ IRm+ .
Let us say that α is max-margin-preferred to β under rescaling t if α mmt β . Now, it can easily happen that α is preferred 
to β under one rescaling, but not under another.
Example 2. Consider t = (3/5, 1/5, 1) rescaling  in Example 1. Then, t equals {(6/5, 3/5), (1/5, 2/5), (1, 1)}. In Fig. 2(a), ≥t is 
the whole shaded region, and it can be seen that ωt = (1, 2) which means the hyperplane with the maximum margin for 
t is x +2y = 0 (instead of x + y = 0). Then, (2, −1.5) mm (0, 0) because (2, −1.5) · (1, 1) = 0.5 > 0, whereas (2, −1.5) mmt
(0, 0) because (2, −1.5) · (1, 2) = −1 < 0.
However, it seems natural to assume that if the user prefers ai over bi then he will also prefer tiai over tibi for any 
ti ∈ IR+ . Also, for test vectors α and β , if α mm β then, for any positive real r, we have rα mm rβ; since the resultant 
preferences are invariant to such rescaling, it seems reasonable that the same would hold for the input preferences.
We therefore consider a more robust relation, which is invariant to the scaling of the preference inputs, with α being 
inputs-scaling-invariant preferred to β only if it is max-margin preferred for all rescalings t ∈ IRm+ of the preference inputs.
Definition 3 (I). For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn we define relation I by, for α, β ∈ IRn , α I β if 
and only if α is max-margin-preferred to β over all rescalings of preference inputs, i.e., if for all t ∈ IRm+ , α mmt β .
So far, we have assumed that each component ti of t can be any strictly positive scalar. However, in Proposition 3
below, we will show that if each ti is restricted to be in (0, 1], the result for relation I will not change. This is not 
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surprising, since, e.g., doubling each component of t will not change the relation mmt . This simplification will be helpful in 
the computation of the I relation.
Proposition 3. Consider any finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn and any α, β ∈ IRn. Then, α I β if and only if for all 
t ∈ (0, 1]m, α mmt β .
We define SI() to be the set consisting solely of ωt for all scalings t ∈ (0, 1]m .
Definition 4 (SI()). For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn , let SI() = {ωt : t ∈ (0,1]m}.
Thus, u ∈ SI() if and only if there exists t ∈ (0, 1]m such that u has minimal norm in ≥t . Proposition 3, along with 
Definition 2, immediately implies the following result, expressing the preference relation I in terms of the set SI().
Proposition 4. For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn and α, β ∈ IRn, we have α I β ⇐⇒ for all w ∈ SI(), 
α · w ≥ β · w.
For example, it can be shown that SI() in Fig. 1(b) is the darkly shaded region, which is the intersection of the shaded 
region ≥ in Fig. 1(b) with co(), which is the dark region in the left-hand figure (see Theorem 7 below). Then, it can be 
seen that (SI())∗ is all the shaded region in Fig. 1(a). This implies that γ I 0 if and only if γ is in any of the shaded 
region in Fig. 1(a). Also, α I β ⇐⇒ α − β I 0.
3.2. Characterisation of SI()
Here, we mathematically characterise SI(); this will lead to a computational method for the I relation. Proposi-
tion 5 below implies that SI() ⊆ ≥ and for every element u in SI(), vector u has minimum norm in ∗ + {u} =
{w + u : w ∈ ∗} (which equals {w ′ ∈ IRn : ∀λ ∈ , w ′ · λ ≥ u · λ}).
In the running example, assume u = (1, 2). Then, ∗ + {u} = {(x, y) : 2x + y ≥ 4, x + 2y ≥ 5, x + y ≥ 3} which is the 
darkly shaded region in Fig. 2(a) (place the origin on u and then draw ∗).
Proposition 5. Consider a finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn and any u ∈ IRn. Then, u ∈ SI() if and only if u ∈ ≥
and u has minimum norm in ∗ + {u}. Thus, in particular, SI() ⊆ ≥ .
We know that u = (1, 2) ∈ SI() because it has minimum norm in t for t = (3/5, 1/5, 1). We can easily see that u ∈ ≥
and has minimum norm in ∗ + {u}. Now, let v be any point between two black circles in Fig. 2(a). Then, v does not have 
minimal norm in ∗ + {v}; in fact, (1, 2) minimises norm in ∗ + {v}. We will see that v /∈ SI().
We will prove (in Proposition 6) that co() is precisely the set of elements u ∈ IRn such that u has minimum norm in 
∗ + {u}. Together with Proposition 5, this will imply Theorem 7 below, which characterises SI.
Proposition 6. Consider any finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn and any u ∈ IRn. Then, u has minimum norm in 
∗ + {u} if and only if u ∈ co().
Propositions 5 and 6 immediately imply the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Consider any finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn. Then, SI() = co() ∩ ≥ .
Proof. u is in SI() if and only if by Proposition 5, u ∈ ≥ and u has minimum norm in ∗ +{u}, which, from Proposition 6, 
holds if and only if u ∈ ≥ and u ∈ co(). 
Theorem 7 shows that SI() in Fig. 1(b) is the darkly shaded region, which is the intersection of the shaded region ≥
in Fig. 1(b) with co(), which is the dark region in Fig. 1(a).
The following result leads immediately to an algorithm to determine, for arbitrary α, β ∈ IRn if α I β , using a linear 
programming solver.
Corollary 8. For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn, let λi ∈  be the ith element of  where i ∈ I = {1, . . . , ||}. 
Consider any u ∈ IRn. Then, u is in SI() if and only if for all i ∈ I , u · λi ≥ 1 and there exist non-negative reals ri for each i ∈ I such 
that u = ∑i∈I riλi .
Proof. The result follows easily from Theorem 7 and the definition of co() and ≥ . 
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Proposition 4 implies that for α, β ∈ IRn , α I β if and only if there exists u ∈ SI() such that α · u < β · u. Using 
Corollary 8 we therefore have the following result which leads immediately to a computational procedure for the preference 
relation I .
Proposition 9. Let  ⊆ IRn be a finite consistent set of preference inputs, and let α, β ∈ IRn. Then α I β if and only if there exists 
u ∈ IRn such that the following three conditions all hold:
(i) u · (β − α) > 0;
(ii) for all i ∈ I , u · λi ≥ 1; and
(iii) there exist non-negative reals ri for each i ∈ I such that u = ∑i∈I riλi .
4. Rescaling of features
As discussed in the introduction, an important, and potentially problematic, pre-processing step in SVM methods is 
rescaling of the domain of each feature. In this section we define a preference relation F (based on preference inputs ) 
that is invariant to the relative scalings of the feature domains.
Normalization of features is a necessary phase in any SVM-based method. This task often involves translations and 
rescalings on the domain of each feature. It is evident that the maximum margin relation is unaffected by translation of 
feature space; i.e., for all δ ∈ IRn , α + δ mm β + δ iff (α + δ) · ω ≥ (β + δ) · ω if and only if α mm β . Therefore, in this 
section we only consider the effect of rescaling of feature spaces.
The effect of rescaling of features on a conventional binary SVM classifier is also discussed in a separate study by the 
authors [50]. In that context, a data point is called strongly positive (respectively negative) if it is positively (resp. negatively) 
classified for all choices of feature scaling. Otherwise, the instance is considered neutral because it is differently classified 
for different scalings of features.
Let IRn+ be the set of strictly positive vectors in IRn , i.e., vectors with every component strictly positive. Let features 
rescaling τ ∈ IRn+ be a vector of strictly positive reals, with the jth component τ ( j) being the scale factor for the jth 
feature. The effect of the rescaling on a vector λ ∈ IRn is given by pointwise multiplication, λ 
 τ , defined by, for all 
j = 1, . . . , n, (λ 
 τ )( j) = λ( j)τ ( j). Operation 
 is commutative, associative and distributes over addition of vectors. An 
important property is that for any u, v, w ∈ IRn (u 
 v) · w = v · (u 
 w), since they are both equal to ∑nj=1 u( j)v( j)w( j). 
For τ ∈ IRn+ , we define τ−1 to be the element of IRn+ given by τ−1( j) = 1/τ ( j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. The rescaling vector 
changes the preference inputs , turning it into  
 τ = {λ 
 τ : λ ∈ }. Let ω
τ be the element with minimum norm in 
( 
 τ )≥ , where ( 
 τ )≥ = {w ∈ IRn : ∀λ ∈ , w · (λ 
 τ ) ≥ 1}.
Example 3. Consider τ = (2, 3) rescaling features of  in Example 1. Then,  
 τ will be {(4,3), (2,6), (2,3)}. The shaded 
region in Fig. 2(b) shows ( 
 τ )≥ , and it can be seen that ω
τ = (2/13, 3/13). Then, (2, −1) 
 τ mm
τ (0, 0) 
 τ because 
(2, −1) 
 (2, 3) · (2/13, 3/13) = −1/13 < 0, whereas (2, −1) mm (0, 0) because (2, −1) · (1/2, 1/2) = 1/2 > 0.
Like rescaling of inputs, we see that α might be preferred to β under one rescaling of features, but not under another. 
However, the choice of how the features are scaled relative to each other can involve somewhat arbitrary choices. It is 
therefore natural to consider a more cautious preference relation, features-scaling-invariant preference relation, given by α
being preferred to β for all rescalings τ ∈ IRn+ .
Definition 5 (F). For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn we define relation F by, for α, β ∈ IRn , α F β if 




We define the set of vectors SF() as follows.
Definition 6 (SF()). For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn , define SF() to be {ω
τ 
 τ : τ ∈ IRn+}.
We then have the following simple relationship between SF() and the preference relation F .
Proposition 10. For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn, and any α, β ∈ IRn, we have α F β ⇐⇒ for all w ∈ SF(), 
α · w ≥ β · w.
Proof. We have that α F β ⇐⇒ for all τ ∈ IRn+ , α
τ mm
τ β 
τ . Now, α
τ mm
τ β 




 τ ) · ω
τ , i.e., α · (ω
τ 
 τ ) ≥ β · (ω
τ 
 τ ). Thus, α F β ⇐⇒ for all τ ∈ IRn+ , α · (ω
τ 
 τ ) ≥ β · (ω
τ 
 τ ), 
which is if and only if for all w ∈ SF(), α · w ≥ β · w . 
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4.1. Rescale optimality
We define an important notion, rescale optimality, for understanding the set SF(), and hence the features-scaling-
invariant preference relation F . We will see below, in Proposition 11, that SF() is equal to the set of rescale optimal 
elements of ≥ . Because some of the formal concepts and results do not require exactly the form of ≥ , we express them 
in terms of a more general subset G of IRn .
Definition 7 (Rescale-optimal). For G ⊆ IRn , and u ∈ G , let us say that u is rescale-optimal in G if there exists (strictly positive) 
τ ∈ IRn+ with ‖τ 
 w‖ ≥ ‖τ 
 u‖ for all w ∈ G .
It can be seen intuitively that elements of the (open) line segment between (1, 0) and (0, 1) in Fig. 1(b) is the set of 
rescale-optimal elements in ≥; if τ (1) > τ(2) (i.e., with the ratio τ (1)/τ (2) being increased) then ω
τ 
 τ moves from 
(1/2, 1/2) towards (1, 0). Similarly, increasing the ratio τ (2)/τ (1) from 1 moves ω
τ 
 τ from (1/2, 1/2) towards (0, 1).
We will show in Proposition 11 below that SF() is equal to the set of rescale-optimal elements in ≥ . For instance, 
ω
τ 
τ in Example 3 (where τ (2)/τ (1) = 3/2), which is in SF() by the definition, is equal to (2/13, 3/13) 
(2, 3) = (4/13, 9/13), 
that is between (1/2, 1/2) and (0, 1). If SF() equals the line segment between (1, 0) and (0, 1), it can be seen that (SF())∗
is the first quadrant in Fig. 1(a). This implies that in Fig. 1(a), γ F 0 if and only if γ is in the first quadrant.
Proposition 11. Consider any finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn. Then, SF() is equal to the set of all rescale-optimal 
elements of ≥ . Thus, for α, β ∈ IRn, α F β if and only if w · (α − β) ≥ 0 for every rescale-optimal element w in ≥ .
Proposition 11 implies, in particular, that ω is rescale-optimal in 
≥ .
4.2. Pointwise undominated
Let G be some subset of IRn (where we will be applying the results to the case of G = ≥). For u ∈ G , if there exists 
v ∈ G such that for all j, v( j) is between u( j) and 0 then it is easy to see that u cannot be rescale-optimal element in G . 
This is the idea behind being pointwise undominated, which is reminiscent of being Pareto undominated, and is a necessary 
condition for being rescale-optimal. The notion of pointwise dominance leads to a characterisation of when there is a unique 
rescale-optimal element, see Theorem 13 in Section 4.3, which corresponds to the case in which rescaling of features makes 
no difference.
Definition 8 (pointwise dominance). For u, v ∈ IRn , v pointwise dominates u if u = v and for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, either
(i) 0 ≤ v( j) ≤ u( j), or
(ii) 0 ≥ v( j) ≥ u( j).
For u ∈ G ⊆ IRn , we say that u is pointwise undominated in G if there exists no v ∈ G that pointwise dominates u.
In Fig. 1(b), all elements on the part of closed line segment x + y = 1 within the first quadrant (i.e., including points on 
the axes) are pointwise undominated in ≥ . The definition easily implies that being rescale-optimal implies being pointwise 
undominated (but not the converse).
Proposition 12. Let G ⊆ IRn. If u is rescale-optimal in G then u is pointwise undominated in G. Thus, if u is pointwise dominated in 
G then u is not rescale-optimal in G.
Proof. Suppose that u is not pointwise undominated in G , so that there exists v ∈ G that pointwise dominates u. Then, 
for every j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, |v( j)| ≤ |u( j)|, and for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, |v(k)| < |u(k)|, which implies that for every τ ∈ IRn+ , ‖v 
 τ‖ < ‖u 
 τ‖, and hence, u is not rescale-optimal in G . 
Proposition 12 states that being pointwise undominated is a necessary condition for being rescale-optimal. However, by 
having a look at our running example we will see that this not a sufficient condition. The intersection points of x + y = 1
with the axes (i.e., (1, 0) and (0, 1)) are pointwise undominated but not rescale-optimal in ≥ . To see this, suppose that 
for example (1, 0) were rescale-optimal in ≥; i.e., there exists τ ∈ IR2+ such that for all v ∈ ≥ − {(1,0)}, ‖(1,0) 
 τ‖ <
‖v 
 τ‖. In particular, there exists τ ∈ IR2+ such that for all ε ∈ (0, 1], ‖(1,0) 
 τ‖ < ‖(1 − ε, ε) 
 τ‖, i.e., τ 2(x) < (1 −
ε)2τ 2(x) + ε2τ 2(y). Letting r = τ (x)/τ (y), we obtain, there exists r ∈ IR+ such that for all ε ∈ (0, 1], r2 < (1 − ε)2r2 + ε2, 
and thus, r2 < ε2/(1 −(1 −ε)2) = ε/(2 −ε). Now, for any r ∈ IR+ there exists sufficiently small ε > 0 such that ε/(2 −ε) < r2, 
proving that (1, 0) is not rescale-optimal in ≥ by contradiction. We can use a similar argument to show that (0, 1) is not 
rescale-optimal in ≥ as well. We will investigate this further in Section 4.4, leading to a computational procedure for 
rescale-optimality. First, in Section 4.3, we characterise the situations when rescaling of features makes no difference, in 
which case F is the same as mm .
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Fig. 3. The visual representation of Example 4 when  = {(−1,3), (3,−1)}. ≥ is the shaded region with a single extremal point at (1/2, 1/2). In this case, 
F is equal to mm .
4.3. Determining invariance to rescaling of features
Example 4 below illustrates that allowing rescaling of features can sometimes make no difference in maximum margin 
relation.
Example 4. Consider  be {(−1, 3), (3, −1)} so that ≥ = {(x, y) : −x + 3y ≥ 1, 3x − y ≥ 1} which is the shaded region 
in Fig. 3. Here, ≥ has a single extremal point at (1/2, 1/2). Since (1/2, 1/2) is the element with minimal norm in ≥ , 
ω = (1/2, 1/2), and so (1/2, 1/2) is rescale-optimal in ≥ . Also, all other points in ≥ are pointwise dominated by (1/2, 1/2); 
thus, by Proposition 12, they are not rescale-optimal. Consequently, the only element of ≥ that is rescale-optimal is 
(1/2, 1/2).
Note that if there exists a unique rescale-optimal element in ≥ , then this element must be ω , since the latter is 
rescale-optimal by Proposition 11. This immediately implies that F is then equal to mm . Therefore this is the situation 
in which rescaling of the features has no effect on the preference relation.
Theorem 13 below states that u is the only rescale-optimal element in convex closed G if and only if u pointwise 
dominates every other element of G .
Theorem 13. Let G be a convex and closed subset of IRn, and let u be an element of G. Then the following conditions are equivalent.
(i) u is uniquely rescale-optimal in G, i.e., u is the unique element of G that is rescale-optimal;
(ii) for all v ∈ G, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, |v( j)| ≥ |u( j)|;
(iii) u pointwise dominates every element in G − {u}.
Consider  as it is in Example 4. Then, the three conditions hold for u = (1/2, 1/2). The equivalence between (i) and (ii) 
is proved using Lemmas 42 and 43, and the equivalence between (ii) and (iii) follows using Lemma 15.
Corollary 14. Let  ⊆ IRn be a finite consistent set of preference inputs. Choose an arbitrary element y ∈ ≥ . Using y we will generate 
an element y∗ ∈ IRn. For each j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}: If y( j) = 0 then let y∗( j) = 0. If y( j) > 0 then let y∗( j) = inf{w( j) : w ∈ ≥, w( j) ≥
0}. If y( j) < 0 then let y∗( j) = sup{w( j) : w ∈ ≥, w( j) ≤ 0}. If y∗ ∈ ≥ then y∗ is uniquely rescale-optimal in ≥. Also, there 
exists a uniquely rescale-optimal element in ≥ if and only if y∗ ∈ ≥ .
Consider  as in Example 4. Choose y = (1, 1) which is in ≥ . Since y(1) = 1 > 0, y∗(1) = inf{w(1) : w ∈ ≥, w(1) ≥
0} = 12 . Similarly, y(2) = 1 implies that y∗(2) = 12 . Because ( 12 , 12 ) ∈ ≥ , it is uniquely rescale-optimal in ≥ . If you consider 
 as in Example 1, then y = (1, 1) will be updated to y∗ = (0, 0), and because (0, 0) /∈ ≥ , there does not exist a uniquely 
rescale-optimal element in ≥ .
To prove the corollary we use the following lemma.
Lemma 15. Let G be a convex subset of IRn, and let j be any element of {1, . . . ,n}. Then either (i) there exists w ∈ G such that 
w( j) = 0; or (ii) for all w ∈ G, w( j) > 0; or (iii) for all w ∈ G, w( j) < 0.
Proof of Corollary 14. Consider any j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Lemma 15 implies that if y( j) > 0 then for all w ∈ ≥ , 0 < y∗( j) ≤ w( j); 
and if y( j) < 0 then for all w ∈ ≥ , 0 > y∗( j) ≥ w( j), so for all w ∈ ≥ , either 0 ≤ y∗( j) ≤ w( j) or 0 ≥ y∗( j) ≥ w( j). 
Theorem 13 implies that if y∗ ∈ ≥ then y∗ is uniquely rescale-optimal in ≥ .
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Conversely, suppose that there exists a uniquely rescale-optimal element u in ≥; we will prove that y∗ ∈ ≥ . Consider 
arbitrary j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. The fact that ≥ is a polyhedron implies that there exists some w ∈ ≥ with w( j) = y∗( j). If 
y∗( j) > 0 then we know by Lemma 15 that u( j) ≥ y∗( j). But Theorem 13 implies that u( j) ≤ w( j) = y∗( j), and thus 
y∗( j) = u( j). Similarly, if y∗( j) < 0 then y∗( j) ≥ u( j) ≥ w( j) = y∗( j) and so, y∗( j) = u( j). If y∗( j) = 0 then w( j) = 0, so 
u( j) = 0, also using Theorem 13. We have shown that y∗ = u, so y∗ ∈ ≥ . 
Corollary 14 leads immediately to an algorithm for determining if ≥ has a uniquely rescale-optimal element, and 
finding it, if it exists. This is the situation in which rescaling of the features makes no difference. The algorithm involves at 
most n + 1 runs of a linear programming solver, and thus determining and finding a uniquely rescale-optimal element u can 
be performed in polynomial time. If it succeeds in finding such a u then the induced preferences can be efficiently tested 
using: α F β if and only if u · (α − β) ≥ 0.
4.4. Characterising rescale-optimality
As we have shown, being pointwise undominated is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for being rescale-optimal. 
In this section we define a stronger version of pointwise undominated called zm-pointwise undominated, where ‘zm’ stands 
for zeros-modified (the essential difference being in the treatment of j such that u( j) = 0). We show that this is a necessary 
condition as well, and is in fact also a sufficient condition for being rescale-optimal (for polyhedra). According to the 
following definition, while the points (1, 0) and (0, 1) in Fig. 1(b) are pointwise undominated, they are not zm-pointwise 
undominated.
Definition 9 (zm-pointwise Dominance). For u, v ∈ IRn , let Nu = { j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} : u( j) = 0}. v zm-pointwise dominates u if 
there exists k ∈ Nu such that u(k) = v(k) and for all j ∈ Nu , either (i) 0 ≤ v( j) ≤ u( j), or (ii) 0 ≥ v( j) ≥ u( j).
For u ∈ G ⊆ IRn , we say that u is zm-pointwise undominated in G if there exists no v ∈ G that zm-pointwise dominates u.
Clearly, if every component of u is non-zero, then Nu = {1, . . . ,n}, and so for any vector v ∈ IRn we have that v
zm-pointwise dominates u if and only if v pointwise dominates u. Proposition 16 below gives a characterisation of (i) 
rescale-optimal, and (ii) zm-pointwise undominated. Together, these immediately imply part (iii), that being zm-pointwise 
undominated is a necessary condition for being rescale-optimal.
Proposition 16. Let u be an element of convex G ⊆ IRn. Then:
(i) u is rescale-optimal in G if and only if there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that for all v ∈ G, (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u) ≥ 0 (i.e., (τ 
 u) · (τ 

(v − u)) ≥ 0).
(ii) u is zm-pointwise undominated in G if and only if for all v ∈ G, there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u) ≥ 0.
(iii) If u is rescale-optimal in G then u is zm-pointwise undominated in G.
We say that u, v ∈ IRn agree on signs if, for each component j, u( j) and v( j) have equal sign.
Definition 10 (Agreeing on Signs). For u, v ∈ IRn , u and v agree on signs if for all j = 1, . . . , n,
(i) u( j) = 0 ⇐⇒ v( j) = 0;
(ii) u( j) > 0 ⇐⇒ v( j) > 0; and thus also:
(iii) u( j) < 0 ⇐⇒ v( j) < 0.
For example, (1, 0) and (1, 1) do not agree on signs but for ε > 0, (1, ε) and (1, 1) agree on signs. Clearly, if u and 
v agree on signs then u · v > 0, unless they’re both the zero vector. The following is the key theorem of this section to 
characterise rescale-optimality by making use of Proposition 16(i). This characterisation is the basis of the computational 
procedure for the features-scaling-invariant preference relation F developed in Section 4.6.
Theorem 17. Consider any u in convex G ⊆ IRn. If u = 0 then it is the unique rescale-optimal element of G. Otherwise, u is rescale-
optimal in G if and only if there exists μ ∈ IRn agreeing on signs with u such that μ · u = 1 and for all w ∈ G, μ · w ≥ 1.
To illustrate this result, consider u be any element of the part of the open line segment x + y = 1 within the first 
quadrant in Fig. 1(b); i.e., u = (δ, 1 − δ) for some δ ∈ (0, 1). Then for μ = (1, 1), μ and u agree on signs and u · μ = 1, and 
for all w ∈ ≥ , μ · w ≥ 1. Therefore, u is rescale-optimal in ≥ .
Proof. It is clear that if u = 0 then for all τ ∈ IRn+ and for all w ∈ G − {u}, ‖u 
 τ‖ = 0 < ‖w 
 τ‖, which means that u is 
the unique rescale-optimal element of G . Now, suppose u = 0.
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⇒: First, let us assume that u is rescale-optimal in G . Then, by Proposition 16(i), there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that for all 
w ∈ G , (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (w − u) ≥ 0. Let μ′ = τ 
 τ 
 u. Because, u = 0, μ′ · u = ‖τ 
 u‖2 > 0. Then, we let μ = μ′μ′ ·u which 
leads to μ · u = 1. In addition, μ and μ′ agree on signs because μ′ · u > 0, and μ′ and u agree on signs, by the definition of 
μ′ , and hence μ and u agree on signs. Consider any w ∈ G . We know that (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (w − u) ≥ 0, i.e., μ′ · (w − u) ≥ 0, 
which implies that μ · (w − u) ≥ 0, and therefore, μ · w ≥ 1 = μ · u.
⇐: For the converse, we assume that there exists μ ∈ IRn agreeing on signs with u such that μ · u = 1 and for all 
w ∈ G , μ · w ≥ 1, and thus, μ · (w − u) ≥ 0. Define τ ∈ IRn by τ ( j) = 1 if u( j) = 0, and τ ( j) =
√
μ( j)
u( j) whenever u( j) = 0, 
which is well-defined, because μ( j)/u( j) > 0 whenever u( j) = 0, using the fact that μ and u agree on signs. That fact 
also means that u( j) = 0 implies that μ( j) = 0. We then have that for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, τ ( j)2u( j) = μ( j), which implies 
that τ 
 τ 
 u = μ. Therefore, for all w ∈ G , (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (w − u) ≥ 0, which implies that u is rescale-optimal in G , by 
Proposition 16(i). 
4.5. Equivalence of rescale-optimal with zm-pointwise undominated
It turns out that being zm-pointwise undominated is equivalent to being rescale-optimal, for a polyhedron, and therefore, 
in particular, for ≥; see Theorem 18 below. The rather complex proof of this result can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 18. Let u be an element of polyhedron G ⊆ IRn. Then, u is rescale-optimal in G if and only if u is zm-pointwise undominated 
in G.
4.6. Expressing rescale-optimality in terms of positive linear combinations
Here we extend the characterisation of rescale-optimality given in Theorem 17, leading to a computational method for 
testing rescale-optimality, and thus to a method for testing if α F β , for α, β ∈ IRn , i.e., preference with respect to the 
features-scaling-invariant preference relation. Theorem 17 implies that non-zero u is rescale-optimal in convex set G if and 
only if there exists a vector μ that agrees on signs with u with μ · w ≥ μ · u for all w ∈ G . Theorem 21 below shows that 
μ is a positive linear combination of certain vectors when G is a polyhedron, which thus includes the case when G = ≥ . 
This leads to a characterisation in Theorem 23 of SF(), giving a computation procedure for the preference relation F , 
summed up in Proposition 24.
We can write any polyhedron as G I = {w ∈ IRn : ∀i ∈ I, w · λi ≥ ai}, for finite I , and with each λi ∈ IRn and ai ∈ IR . We 
also consider G Ju = {w ∈ IRn : ∀i ∈ Ju, w · λi ≥ ai}, where Ju = {i ∈ I : λi · u = ai}. Clearly, for all u ∈ G I , G I ⊆ G Ju .
For example, consider a1 = a2 = 1, u = (1, 0), v = (1/2, 1/2) and y = (1, 1), with the vectors λi for i ∈ I = {1,2,3} being as 
in Example 1 and Fig. 1. Then, G Ju = {w ∈ IR2 : w · (1, 1) ≥ 1, w · (1, 2) ≥ 1}; G J v = {w ∈ IR2 : w · (1, 1) ≥ 1}; and G J y = IR2
because J y = ∅.
The following pair of lemmas are used in the proof, with the first one following very easily from the definition.
Lemma 19. G Ju + {−u} is equal to {λi : i ∈ Ju}∗ .
Lemma 20. Consider a polyhedron G I and non-zero u ∈ G I . Then u is rescale-optimal in G I if and only if u is rescale-optimal in G Ju .
Theorem 21. Let G be a polyhedron, which we write as G I = {w ∈ IRn : ∀i ∈ I, w · λi ≥ ai}, for finite I , and with each λi ∈ IRn and 
ai ∈ IR . Consider any non-zero vector u in G I . Then, u is rescale-optimal in G I if and only if there exists μ ∈ IRn that agrees on signs 
with u such that μ · u = 1 and μ ∈ co({λi : i ∈ Ju}).
Recall the example illustrating Theorem 17 where u = (δ, 1 − δ) for some (arbitrary) δ ∈ (0, 1). We can see that the set 
{λi : i ∈ Ju} equals {(1, 1)}. So, choosing μ = (1, 1) gives that u is rescale-optimal in ≥ because u and μ agree on signs, 
u · μ = 1, and μ ∈ co({(1, 1)}).
Note that this theorem implies that if non-zero u is rescale-optimal in G I then Ju is non-empty, since 0 is the only 
positive linear combination of the empty set, and μ = 0.
Proof. First consider μ ∈ IRn such that μ · u = 1. Then it can be seen that {w : w · μ ≥ 1} + {−u} = ({μ})∗ . Also, G Ju ⊆{w : w · μ ≥ 1} if and only if G Ju + {−u} ⊆ ({μ})∗ ⇐⇒ {λi : i ∈ Ju}∗ ⊆ ({μ})∗ , using Lemma 19, which is if and only if, 
μ ∈ co({λi : i ∈ Ju}) (because of a standard result—see Lemma 33).
By Lemma 20, u is rescale-optimal in G I if and only if u is rescale-optimal in G Ju , which, by Theorem 17, is if and only 
if there exists μ ∈ IRn agreeing on signs with u such that μ · u = 1 and G Ju ⊆ {w : w · μ ≥ 1}, i.e., μ ∈ co({λi : i ∈ Ju}), by 
the earlier argument. 
We have the following corollary (using the same notation), which shows that testing if u is rescale-optimal in G I can 
be performed in polynomial time: by first checking that u ∈ G I (i.e., for all i ∈ I , u · λi ≥ ai ), and then testing if a set of 
inequalities has a solution, using a linear programming solver.
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Corollary 22. Let u be a non-zero element of IRn. Then, u is rescale-optimal in G I if and only if u ∈ G I and there exists non-negative 
reals ri for each i ∈ Ju , and vector τ ∈ IRn with for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, τ ( j) ≥ 1, and τ ( j)u( j) = ∑i∈ Ju riλi( j).
Proof. First suppose that u is rescale-optimal in G I . Then u ∈ G I , and, by Theorem 21, there exists μ ∈ IRn that agrees on 




iλi . For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such 
that u( j) = 0, define t j = μ( j)/u( j), which is greater than zero, because μ and u agree on signs, and let t be the minimum 
of these values. Define τ by τ ( j) = 1 if u( j) = 0 and otherwise, define τ ( j) = t j/t . Then for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, τ ( j) ≥ 1, and 
τ ( j)u( j) = μ( j)/t = ∑i∈ Ju (r′i/t)λi( j).
Conversely, suppose that u ∈ G I and there exists non-negative reals ri for each i ∈ Ju and vector τ ∈ IRn with for all 
j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, τ ( j) ≥ 1, and τ ( j)u( j) = ∑i∈ Ju riλi( j). Define μ ∈ IRn to be τ
u(τ
u)·u . Then μ · u = 1, and μ agrees on signs 
with u, and is a positive linear combination of {λi : i ∈ Ju}. Theorem 21 then can be applied to give the result. 
Theorem 21 implies the following, which leads to a computational method for checking dominance with respect to F .
Theorem 23. Consider finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn, and any u ∈ IRn. Define u = {λ ∈  : λ · u = 1}. Then, u is 
in SF() if and only if u ∈ ≥ and there exists μ ∈ IRn such that μ agrees on signs with u, and μ ∈ co(u). Also, u is in SF() if and 
only if u ∈ ≥ and there exists μ ∈ IRn and some subset  of u such that || ≤ n + 1, and μ ∈ co(), and μ agrees on signs with 
u.
Proof. Proposition 11 implies that SF() equals the set of all rescale-optimal elements of ≥ . Hence, Theorem 21 implies 
that u ∈ SF() if and only if u ∈ ≥ and there exists μ ∈ IRn that agrees on signs with u such that μ ∈ co(u) and μ ·u = 1. 
First, we will show that the condition μ · u = 1 can be omitted.
Suppose first that u ∈ ≥ and there exists μ ∈ IRn that agrees on signs with u such that μ ∈ co(u). Now, u is a non-
zero vector, since u ∈ ≥ . Since μ agrees on signs with u, we haveμ · u > 0. Define μ′ = μμ·u . Then μ′ ∈ co(), μ′ · u = 1, 
and μ′ and u agree on signs. We can then apply Theorem 21 to give u ∈ SF(). The converse follows immediately from the 
same theorem.
The last part follows from Carathéodory’s Theorem (see e.g., 3.1.2 in [51]) which states that for any w ∈ IRn and any 
S ⊆ IRn , if w ∈ co(S) then there exists S ′ ⊆ S with |S ′| ≤ n + 1 such that w ∈ co(S ′). 
Proposition 10 implies that for α, β ∈ IRn , α F β if and only if there exists u ∈ SF() such that α · u < β · u. Theorem 23
then implies the following characterisation, leading to a computational procedure for the F relation (see Section 7.2
below).
Proposition 24. Let  ⊆ IRn be a finite consistent set of preference inputs, and let α, β ∈ IRn. We have α F β if and only if there 
exists u ∈ IRn and μ ∈ IRn such that the following four conditions all hold:
(i) u · (β − α) > 0;
(ii) for all i ∈ I , u · λi ≥ 1 (i.e., u ∈ ≥);
(iii) for all j = {1, . . . , n}, u( j) = 0 ⇐⇒ μ( j) = 0, and u( j) > 0 ⇐⇒ μ( j) > 0 (i.e., agreeing on signs); and
(iv) there exists some subset  of u = {λ ∈  : λ · u = 1} such that || ≤ n + 1, and there exist non-negative reals ri for each i ∈ I
such that μ = ∑i∈I riλi where ri = 0 if λi /∈  (so, μ ∈ co()).
Condition (iv) holds if and only if there exist non-negative reals ri for each i ∈ I such that ∑i∈I (ri = 0) ≤ n + 1 (i.e., |{i ∈ I : ri = 0}| ≤ n + 1), and μ = ∑i∈I riλi , and for all i ∈ I , either u · λi = 1 or ri = 0.
5. Simultaneous rescaling of features and inputs
Having defined the preference relations I and F , based, respectively, on rescaling of preference inputs and features, 
it is also natural to consider both kinds of rescaling simultaneously. In this section, we define and characterise a preference 
relation based on allowing both the rescaling of features and of preference inputs.
Definition 11 (SIF() and I,F ). For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn , we define the set SIF() by w ∈ SIF()
if there exists t ∈ (0, 1]m such that w ∈ SF(t); i.e., SIF() = {ωt
τ 
 τ : t ∈ (0,1]m, τ ∈ IRn+}. We define relation I,F by 
α I,F β ⇐⇒ for all w ∈ SIF(), w · α ≥ w · β .
This definition implies that α I,F β if and only if for all rescalings of the features and the preference inputs, α is 
max-margin preferred to β . We have the following characterisation, which leads to a computational method for checking if 
α I,F β .
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Theorem 25. Let  ⊆ IRn be a finite consistent set of preference inputs. Then, u ∈ SIF() if and only if u ∈ ≥ and there exists μ ∈ IRn
that agrees on signs with u such that μ ∈ co().
Consider  as in Example 1. For any choice of μ ∈ co(), we have either μ = (0, 0) or μ(1) > 0 and μ(2) > 0 (see 
Fig. 1(a)). Because (0, 0) /∈ ≥ , u ∈ SIF() if u(1) > 0 and u(2) > 0 (to agree on signs with μ); however, u = (0, 0) because 
(0, 0) /∈ ≥ . As a result, SIF() is the part of ≥ (i.e., the darkly shaded region) that is strictly within the first quadrant in 
Fig. 1(b). It can be seen that (SIF())∗ is the first quadrant in Fig. 1(a). This implies that for γ ∈ IRn , γ I,F 0 if and only if 
γ is in the first quadrant in Fig. 1(a).
Proof. We first show that SIF() ⊆ ≥ . We have SIF() = ⋃t SF(t), where the union is over all t ∈ (0, 1]m . Also, by 
Proposition 11, SF(t) ⊆ ≥t ; it follows easily that ≥t ⊆ ≥ (see Lemma 39 below), and thus we have SF(t) ⊆ ≥ . 
Therefore, SIF() ⊆ ≥ .
Now suppose that u ∈ SIF(); as shown above, we then have u ∈ ≥ . By definition of SIF() there exists t ∈
(0, 1]m such that u ∈ SF(t). Theorem 23 implies that there exists μ ∈ IRn , that agrees on signs with u, such that 
μ ∈ co({tiλi ∈ t : tiλi · u = 1}), and thus, in particular, μ is in co(t), which equals co(). Hence, there exists μ ∈ IRn , 
that agrees on signs with u, such that μ ∈ co().
For the converse, assume that u ∈ ≥ and there exists μ ∈ IRn , that agrees on signs with u, such that μ ∈ co(). Let us 
define t ∈ IRm+ by t(i) = 1λi ·u for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Because u ∈ ≥ we have λi · u ≥ 1, and thus, t(i) ∈ (0, 1]. Then, for all i we 
have tiλi · u = 1, which implies that u ∈ ≥t and also that  = {λi ∈  : tiλi · u = 1}. Now, co({λi ∈  : tiλi · u = 1}) equals 
co({tiλi ∈ t : tiλi · u = 1}), and hence, μ ∈ co({tiλi ∈ t : tiλi · u = 1}). Since, u ∈ ≥t , Theorem 23 implies that u ∈ SF(t). 
We therefore have that u ∈ SIF(). 
This result gives rise a computational procedure for the I,F relation; Definition 11 implies that for α, β ∈ IRn , α I,F β if 
and only if there exists u ∈ SIF() such that α · u < β · u, which leads, by Theorem 25, to following characterisation of I,F .
Proposition 26. Let  ⊆ IRn be a finite consistent set of preference inputs, and let α, β ∈ IRn. Then, α I,F β if and only if there exists 
u, μ ∈ IRn, such that the following four conditions all hold:
(i) u · (β − α) > 0;
(ii) for all i ∈ I , u · λi ≥ 1 (i.e., u ∈ ≥);
(iii) for all j = {1, . . . , n}, u( j) = 0 ⇐⇒ μ( j) = 0, and u( j) > 0 ⇐⇒ μ( j) > 0 (i.e., agreeing on signs); and
(iv) there exist non-negative reals ri for each i ∈ I such that μ = ∑i∈I riλi (i.e., μ ∈ co()).
6. Generating a consistent preference input set
There are a number ways of extending the approach to deal with inconsistent input information, i.e., when ≥ is empty, 
where  is the (finite) set of preference inputs. One desirable property of such a method is that it should not depend on 
an arbitrary ordering of the input set . Here, we describe three possible approaches for restoring consistency, which all 
satisfy this property.
The first approach is iteratively eliminating the elements of  that are least consistent with others. Define the function 
C :  → IR such that for every i ∈ I , C(λi) = ∑ j∈I−{i} λi · λ j . This function expresses a kind of degree of consistency of the 
element λi with other elements of , where the smaller the value of C(λi) is, the less consistency there is between λi and 
the other elements of . Then the simple procedure Algorithm 1 can be followed to generate a consistent subset of .
Algorithm 1 Generating Consistent Subset of .
1: function Generating Consistent Subset()
2: while ≥ = ∅ do   is inconsistent
3: γ := arg minλ∈ C(λ)  γ minimises C
4:  :=  − {γ }  Remove γ from 
5: end while
6: return    is now consistent
7: end function
The second method forms a consistent subset of  based on the sum μ = ∑λ∈ λ of the preference input vectors: see 
Proposition 27 below. Unless μ is the zero vector, μ = {λ ∈  : λ · μ > 0} is non-empty and consistent. We can therefore 
define ωμ to be the solution of the maximum margin approach for μ . Then, we return ωμ = {λ ∈  : λ · ωμ > 0}
which is again consistent, and we have μ ⊆ ωμ ⊆ .
Proposition 27. Consider any finite subset  of IRn, and define μ = ∑λ∈ λ and define μ to be {λ ∈  : λ · μ > 0}. Assume that 
μ = 0. Then the following hold.
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(i) μ is non-empty and consistent, i.e., (μ)> = ∅.
(ii) Let ωμ be the solution of the maximum margin approach for μ, i.e., the minimal norm element in (μ)
≥ . Then ωμ =
{λ ∈  : λ · ωμ > 0} is non-empty and consistent, and μ ⊆ ωμ ⊆ .
A third approach involves adding m extra real variables (i.e., m dummy features), one for each λi (with i ∈ I = {1, . . . ,m}) 
and extend each λi to the extra m variables by it having a value ε in the corresponding column, and zeros in the other 
m − 1 columns. Here, ε is a strictly positive (typically small) number that relates inversely to the penalty for softening the 
constraints.
More formally, we say that u ∈ IRn+m extends v ∈ IRn if for each j = 1, . . . , n, u( j) = v( j). For each i ∈ I we define δi as 
follows: δi extends λi , and δi(n + i) = ε, and δi(n + j) = 0 for j ∈ I − {i}. Let , the extended preference inputs set, equal 
{δi : i ∈ I}.
Consider any w ∈ IRn , and any u ∈ IRn+m that extends w . Then, for each i ∈ I , u · δi = w · λi + εu(n + i). Thus, u · δi ≥ 1
if and only if u(n + i) ≥ 1ε (1 − w · λi). If w · λi ≥ 1 then we can satisfy the constraint u · δi ≥ 1 by setting u(n + i) = 0. 
Otherwise, we can satisfy the constraint by letting u(n + i) = 1ε (1 − w · λi). (In fact, since we are interested in minimising 
the norm, or a rescaled version of the norm, we only need to consider this particular way of extending w to IRn+m .)
This implies that any w ∈ IRn can be extended to an element of ≥; so, in particular, the extended input set  is always 
consistent. However, if w is not close to satisfying λi , i.e., if w · λi is a large negative number, then the value of u(n + i), 
and hence the norm of u, will be large. This shows that vectors w ∈ IRn that come close to satisfying the input constraints 
will be favoured.
The definitions and mathematical machinery for the various preference relations defined above can then proceed as in 
the previous sections but now working within IRn+m . When testing dominance the test vectors α and β are extended with 
the same value (e.g., 0) for the extra m components.
7. Properties of relations and computation of inferences
In previous sections, we defined a number of preference relations. In Section 7.1 we give some properties, in particular, 
regarding the relationships between the preference relations. In Section 7.2 we express the computational characterisations, 
derived in earlier sections, in terms of constraints, which enable simple implementation.
7.1. Properties of the different preference relations
We have considered the following preference relations: the consistency-based relation C (Section 2.1), the relation 
I based on rescaling preference inputs for the maximum margin preference relation (Section 3), relation F based on 
rescaling of features (Section 4) and relation I,F based on rescaling both inputs and features (Section 5).
For each of the relations C, I, F and 
I,F
 , the corresponding set of scenarios is defined to be SC(), SI(), SF()
and SIF(), respectively, where SC() is defined to be ≥ . For u ∈ IRn recall that the total pre-order ≥u is given by α ≥u β
⇐⇒ u · α ≥ u · β . Let  be any of the relations C, I, F and I,F and let S be the corresponding set of scenarios for 
each relation, so that  = S using the notation of Section 2.3. We then have that  is the intersection of relations ≥u
over all u ∈ S: see Section 2.1, and Proposition 4, Proposition 10 and Definition 11.
We also consider the intersection of I and F , which we call I∧F , so that, for α, β ∈ IRn , α I∧F β if and only if 
α I β and α F β , which is if and only if α ≥u β for all u ∈ SI() ∪ SF(). Hence, if S = SI() ∪ SF() then S equals 
I∧F = I ∩ F .
These relations, as well as mm , are all reflexive and transitive, and thus pre-orders (with mm being a total pre-order). 
This is because each relation is equal to an intersection of pre-orders. For similar reasons, the relations are preserved under 
some simple transformations.
We say that binary relation  on IRn is preserved by translation and uniform positive scaling if for any λ ∈  and for 
α, β, γ ∈ IRn and r ∈ IR+ , if α  β then α + γ  β + γ and rα  rβ .
Proposition 28. For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn, we have the following relationships between the sets of scenar-
ios:
ω ∈ SI() ∩ SF() and SI() ∪ SF() ⊆ SIF() ⊆ SC() = ≥ .
Let  be any of the relations mm , C , I , F and 
I,F
 . Then,  is a pre-order preserved by translation and uniform positive scaling, 
and λ  0 for all λ ∈  (where  is the strict part of ). In addition, these relations are nested in the following ways (see Fig. 4):
C ⊆ I,F ⊆ I∧F = I ∩ F , and I ∪ F ⊆ mm .
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Fig. 4. The Venn diagram that depicts relationships between the preference relations defined in this paper.
7.2. Summary of computational characterisations
For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn and arbitrary α, β ∈ IRn , we would like to be able to determine 
which of the following hold: α C β , α I β , α F β and α 
I,F
 β . As usual, we label  as {λi : i ∈ I}. We use the 
results of previous sections to express, in terms of constraints, the condition that α does not dominate β , with respect to 
each of the four relations.
C : α C β if and only if, by Proposition 1(ii), there exists u ∈ ≥ such that u · β > u · α. This holds if and only if 
there exists u ∈ IRn , such that
• u · (β − α) > 0 and
• ∀i ∈ I , u · λi ≥ 1.
I : α I β if and only if there exists u ∈ SI() such that u · β > u · α. Recall that, by Proposition 9, this holds if and 
only if there exists u ∈ IRn , and non-negative reals ri for each i ∈ I , such that
• u · (β − α) > 0;
• ∀i ∈ I , u · λi ≥ 1; and
• u = ∑i∈I riλi .
Note that if t was not restricted to (0, 1]m in the definition of SI(), then the second constraint (i.e., u · λi ≥ 1) 
would be replaced by u · λi > 0 which is computationally more expensive due to the strict inequality. However, as 
we proved in Proposition 3, the result for both cases is the same.
F : α F β if and only if there exists u ∈ SF() such that u · β > u · α. As we saw in Proposition 24, this holds if and 
only if there exists u ∈ IRn and μ ∈ IRn , and non-negative reals ri for each i ∈ I , such that
• u · (β − α) > 0;
• ∀i ∈ I , u · λi ≥ 1;
• ∀i ∈ I , [u · λi = 1 or ri = 0];
• μ = ∑i∈I riλi ;• ∑i∈I (ri = 0) ≤ n + 1; and• ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, u( j) = 0 ⇐⇒ μ( j) = 0, and u( j) > 0 ⇐⇒ μ( j) > 0.
In CPLEX, a disjunctive constraint such as [w ·λi = 1 or ri = 0] can be expressed as (w ·λi == 1) + (ri == 0) ≥ 1
(each logical proposition is treated as an integer; 0 for false and 1 for true).
I,F : α I,F β if and only if there exists u ∈ SIF() such that u · β > u · α. Recall from Proposition 26 that this holds if 
and only if there exists u ∈ IRn and μ ∈ IRn , and non-negative reals ri for each i ∈ I , such that
• u · (β − α) > 0;
• ∀i ∈ I , u · λi ≥ 1;
• μ = ∑i∈I riλi ; and• ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, u( j) = 0 ⇐⇒ μ( j) = 0, and u( j) > 0 ⇐⇒ μ( j) > 0.
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8. Optimality operators
In many decision-making situations, there is no clear ordering on decisions (alternatives). There can often be a set of 
different scenarios with a different ordering on alternatives in each scenario. For example, for different scalings of preference 
inputs, we may have different orderings over a set of alternatives. In such a setup there are a number of natural ways of 
defining the set of optimal solutions (best alternatives or top recommended solutions).
We consider here two kinds of optimality operators in the sense of [52]; namely the set of undominated solutions, which 
is a natural generalisation of the Pareto-optimal set; and the set of possibly optimal solutions. The set of possibly optimal 
alternatives has been considered in a number of different situations, including for voting rules [53], for soft constraint 
optimisation [54], and for multi-objective optimisation [55,52].
Let S be any of the relations C, I, F and 
I,F
 , where S is the corresponding set of scenarios for each relation 
(see Section 7.1), which are respectively SC() (= ≥), SI(), SF() and SIF(). We have then α S β if and only if, for all 
u ∈ S , u · α ≥ u · β . We define S to be the strict part of S , so that α S β if and only if α S β and β S α.
An alternative α is defined to be an element of IRn . For a given finite set of alternatives A, the two optimality operators 
are defined as follows:
UNDS (A) (= UNDS (A)) is the set of undominated elements with respect to relation S , i.e., α ∈ UNDS (A) if and only if 
there is no β ∈ A such that β S α.
POS (A) is the set of elements that are optimal in some scenario. Thus, α ∈ POS (A) if and only if there exists u ∈ S such 
that for all β ∈ A, α · u ≥ β · u. Elements of POS(A) are said to be possibly optimal (in A, given S).
Algorithm 2 Finding Undominated Elements (UNDS (A)) Incrementally.
1: function Incremental-Undominated(A)
2:  = {}  This set contains the undominated elements found so far.
3: for all α ∈ A do
4: ********************** Stage one **************************
5: for all ω ∈  do
6: if ω S α & α S ω then  α is dominated by ω?




11: Reaching this point means α is not dominated by any element of .
12: Now, we will eliminate any ω in  that is dominated by α.
13: ********************** Stage two **************************
14: for all ω ∈  do
15: if α S ω & ω S α then  α dominates ω?








From the definition of UNDS(A) we have α ∈ UNDS (A) if and only if there is no β ∈ A such that β S α and α S β . 
Thus, in order to compute UNDS(A) we can make use of the computation methods proposed in Section 7 for computing 
S .
In contrast, POS(A) cannot be computed just from S , because POS(A) is not a function of S but rather a function of S
(i.e., SF, SI etc.). It follows immediately from the definition that for any finite set of alternatives A, POS (A) = ⋃u∈S PO{u}(A), 
and PO{u}(A) is the set of elements α of A maximising u · α. This in turn implies that for any subsets S and S ′ of IRn , 
POS∪S ′ (A) = POS (A) ∪ POS ′ (A), and if S ⊆ S ′ then POS (A) ⊆ POS ′ (A). Proposition 28 then leads easily to the following result, 
showing nestings of the different forms of Possibly Optimal set.
Proposition 29. For any finite non-empty set A ⊆ IRn of alternatives, and any finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn, 
POSF()(A) ∩ POSI()(A) is non-empty, and POSF()(A) ∪ POSI()(A) = POSI()∪SF()(A) ⊆ POSIF()(A) ⊆ POSC()(A).
For each of the sets S of scenarios SC() SI(), SF() and SIF(), we have a characterisation of the condition [u ∈ S] in 
terms of constraints, see Proposition 1(ii), Corollary 8, Theorem 23 and Theorem 25, respectively. (Each corresponds to the 
set of constraints for α S β shown for the associated relation in Section 7.2, omitting the first constraint u · (β − α) > 0.) 
We then define CS (A, α) to be this set of constraints plus the constraints: for all β ∈ A, α · u ≥ β · u. Hence, u is a solution 
of CS (A, α) if and only if u ∈ S and for all β ∈ A, α · u ≥ β · u. Therefore α ∈ POS (A) if and only if CS (A, α) has a solution.
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For example, CSI()(A, α) is the following set of constraints (compare this with I in Section 7):
• ∀β ∈ A, u · (α − β) ≥ 0;
• ∀i ∈ I , u · λi ≥ 1; and
• u = ∑i∈I riλi .
Typically, but not always (as we found in our experiments), POS (A) is a smaller set than UNDS(A) (since possibly optimal 
alternatives are very often, but not always, undominated).
Propositions 2 and 4 in [52] imply that computation of UNDS (A) and POS(A) can be done with a very simple incremental 
algorithm. We adapt this incremental approach and exploit it for each of the four sets of scenarios.
Algorithm 2 shows how UNDS (A) can be found incrementally. It corresponds with a natural way of computing Pareto 
optimal solutions. The algorithm consists of two stages for each α ∈ A. In the first stage, we examine if α is undominated 
among the undominated elements  found so far. We proceed to the next stage if α is undominated and remove those 
elements of  that are dominated by α (so they are no longer undominated). The correctness of Algorithm 2 is formally 
stated in Proposition 30.
Proposition 30. For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn, given any subset S of ≥ , and any finite set A (⊆ IRn) of 
alternatives, Algorithm 2 returns UNDS (A).
Algorithm 3 Finding Possibly Optimal Elements (POS (A)) Incrementally.
1: function Incremental-PO(A)
2:  = {}
3: for all α ∈ A do
4: u = FS (↓, α)  Solving for α against POs that are found so far.
5: if u is not NULL then  α is a PO element within ↓?







13: The following function eliminates ψ ∈ ↓ which are no longer PO due to arrival of α.
14: *************************************************************************************************
15: function Refine-Previous-POs(, α)
16: for all (ψ, v) ∈  do
17: if ψ · v < α · v then  Is α better than ψ in the scenario v in which ψ was optimal?
18:  =  − {(ψ, v)}
19: u = FS (↓, ψ)  Check if there is another solution which makes ψ optimal.
20: if u is not NULL then





The set of possibly optimal elements POS (A) is built up in an incremental way in Algorithm 3. In this algorithm, FS (A, α)
is a function such that it returns the solution of CS (A, α) if a solution is found, and NULL otherwise. Here,  is a set of 
pairs where the first component of a pair is the potentially possibly optimal element, and the second one is the scenario in 
which the first component has been found to be optimal. Regarding this notation, ↓ is the set of first components in ; 
i.e., ↓ = {ψ : (ψ, u) ∈ }. In Line 6, once it is found out that α is a possibly optimal element within ↓ , it is included in 
 along with its associated solution (scenario). Then, in the function Refine-Previous-POs, we remove any (ψ, v) ∈  which 
is not possibly optimal anymore because of adding α. In Line 18, the existing possibly optimal element ψ is removed from 
 because it is not as good as the incoming possibly optimal element α in its own associated scenario v . However, it does 
not mean that ψ cannot be possibly optimal; there might be another scenario u in which ψ is better than all elements of 
 including α. If it is the case, we include ψ again in  but with this new scenario u instead of v . Proposition 31 formally 
states the correctness of Algorithm 3.
Proposition 31. For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn, given any subset S of ≥ , and any finite set A (⊆ IRn) of 
alternatives, Algorithm 3 returns POS (A).
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Table 2
The results relate to determining decisive pairs, among 1000 pairs of test vectors with respect to 
preference relations F , I , the intersection of I and F (I∧F ), I,F , and C . The bold 
numbers indicate that it is not always the case that F is a weaker relation than I . The last 
row includes the mean of the values of each column, rounded to the nearest integer.
m Decisive Pairs (%) Time (ms)
F I I∧F I,F C F I I,F C
Ridesharing Database
1. 24 21 16 9 3 1 517 36 55 18
2. 29 92 31 31 26 0.3 2434 23 40 16
3. 31 23 28 13 1 0.1 800 25 38 13
4. 36 81 35 35 31 23 4768 24 43 14
5. 38 36 19 17 5 2 2799 24 47 17
6. 41 61 12 12 12 12 5123 23 45 20
7. 53 40 20 19 19 19 1134 24 41 20
8. 55 97 26 26 24 8 1833 26 45 19
9. 62 48 24 24 11 1 4983 27 50 14
10. 94 64 35 35 5 2 5084 27 54 23
11. 127 62 24 24 24 13 6439 28 57 21
12. 129 80 36 36 19 1 2928 30 49 25
13. 134 69 28 28 28 16 7374 30 48 19
Mean 66 59 26 24 16 8 3555 27 48 19
Car Preference Database
1. 26 65 32 31 22 10 2731 28 64 27
2. 30 42 36 28 21 12 1962 26 94 23
3. 30 36 19 17 11 7 4700 23 56 25
4. 35 56 33 30 22 9 6612 24 149 22
5. 35 65 18 17 11 5 5850 25 77 22
6. 35 49 61 41 34 20 377 26 72 31
7. 40 53 36 33 24 13 1411 56 173 78
8. 40 68 46 46 34 15 2879 26 64 25
9. 40 42 39 28 21 14 1150 26 78 27
10. 41 51 35 29 24 12 1317 28 97 23
Mean 35 53 35 30 22 12 2899 29 93 30
9. Experimental testing
In this section we experimentally test the methods and algorithms developed in earlier sections; the results show the 
feasibility of the methods, and illustrate relative computational efficiency, as well as the differences between the various 
relations and optimality classes. It is shown that our preference relations do not necessarily lead to a large number of 
solutions for the decision maker to consider.
The experiments make use of two databases, namely Ridesharing Database and Car Preference Database. The ridesharing 
database is a subset of a year’s worth of real ridesharing records, provided by a commercial ridesharing system Carma
(see http://gocarma .com/). Each ridesharing alternative has 7 features, representing different aspects of a possible choice of 
match for a given user. More information about the data can be found in [45].
The second database is the result of a survey expressing the preferences of different users over specific cars [56]. For 
each car 7 features are considered (e.g., engine size).
We base our experiments on 13 benchmarks derived from the ridesharing database and 10 benchmarks derived from 
the car preference database. Each benchmark corresponds to the inferred preferences of a different user. The preference of 
alternative ai (i.e., a ridesharing alternative or a car) over bi leads to ai − bi(= λi) being included in .
A pre-processing phase deletes some elements of , in order to make it consistent (i.e., ≥ = ∅). In order to do that, 
we adopt the first and the second approaches discussed in Section 6 respectively for the first and the second database. To 
conduct the experiments, CPLEX 12.6.3 is used as the solver on a computer facilitated by an Intel Xeon E312xx 2.20 GHz 
processor and 8 GB RAM memory.
9.1. Decisive pairs
Here, we would like to examine how decisive each relation is, i.e., which relation is weaker and by how much. We 
randomly generate 1000 pairs (α, β), based on a uniform distribution for each feature. A pair (α, β) is called decisive for a 
preference relation if one of them can (strictly) dominate the other one; for example, the pair (α, β) is decisive for I if 
and only if α I β or β I α. This is if and only if either (α I β and β I α) or (β I α and α I β). We also consider 
the relation I∧F which is the intersection of I and F (see Section 7.1; note that this relation differs from the relation 
I,F ).
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Table 3
A comparison, between the number of possibly optimal elements and the number of un-
dominated elements among 100 alternatives with regard to preference relations C , I,F , 
I , and F . The I ∩ F column relates to the intersection of the I and F columns. The bold 
numbers illustrate that the F and I ∩ F sets are not always identical (so that the F optimality 
set is not always a subset of the I optimality set), and the encircled numbers relate to the 
cases when |POS (A)| > |UNDS (A)|. The last row includes the mean of values of each column, 
rounded to the nearest integer.
|POS (A)| |UNDS (A)|
C I, F I F I ∩ F C I, F I F I ∩ F
Ridesharing Database
1. 38 26 20 6 4 72 55 33 16 13
2. 45 13 12 2 2 86 20 15 3 3
3. 64 37 21 6 5 97 74 30 19 18
4. 7 7 7 3 3 7 7 7 4 4
5. 33 32 21 13 12 63 54 38 17 17
6. 14 14 14 5 5 18 18 18 5 5
7. 10 10 10 6 6 18 18 17 7 7
8. 18 9 9 1 1 25 12 12 1 1
9. 34 17 13 6 6 78 19 15 8 8
10. 22 15 8 2 2 50 38 13 2 2
11. 20 14 14 2 2 27 19 19 3 3
12. 41 12 9 2 2 79 24 15 2 2
13. 16 12 12 4 4 29 16 16 6 6
Mean 28 17 13 4 4 50 29 19 7 7
Car Preference Database
1. 14 14 11 6 5 18 18 12 6 6
2. 14 10 3 5 2 15 11 4 5 3
3. 34 30 16 7 3 36 31 26 12 12
4. 17 11 8 2 2 20 13 11 3 3
5. 29 22 21 11 11 34 26 21 9 7
6. 8 5 3 2 2 8 5 3 2 2
7. 12 6 5 3 3 12 6 5 3 3
8. 14 11 5 4 2 15 13 8 4 2
9. 14 11 7 5 4 14 11 7 4 3
10. 15 10 9 4 4 16 10 9 4 4
Mean 17 13 9 5 4 19 14 11 5 5
To determine whether a pair is decisive we need to run the solver, based on the proposed computation methods in 
Section 7, twice; once for testing if α S β and a second time for β S α.
Table 2 shows the percentage of decisive pairs for F , I , I∧F , 
I,F
 and C , as well as the running time per pair. 
The results illustrate some of the relationships expressed in Proposition 28: C ⊆ I,F ⊆ I∧F (which equals I ∩ F). 
They also demonstrate that the subset relations can easily be strict, with I,F not being the same as either the relation I∧F
or the consistency-based relation C . Typically, relation F , relating to rescaling of the features, is much the strongest 
relation, i.e., most decisive, followed by I , which is only slightly more decisive than I∧F , which is a good deal stronger 
than I,F , with the consistency-based relation C being much the weakest (least decisive).
The fact that the relation I , based on preference inputs rescaling, is only slightly more decisive than I∧F suggests that 
I can be close (in some sense) to being a sub-relation of F , since if I ⊆ F then I∧F = I . However, in four of the 
thirteen ridesharing benchmarks, and in nine of the ten Car Preference benchmarks (see Table 2), the number of decisive 
pairs for I is not equal to the number for I∧F . This implies that in these particular benchmarks, we have F  I (and 
hence SF()  SI()). There are even two of the benchmarks (see the figures in bold) in which F is less decisive than 
I .
In terms of running time, I is around 130 and 100 times faster than F on average for the ridesharing database and 
the car preference database, respectively. The computations for C and 
I,F
 are of the same order of magnitude as for 
I , with the former being somewhat faster for the ridesharing database, and those for 
I,F
 being somewhat slower. It is 
interesting that the non-linear constraint for I,F (see Section 7.2) makes much less of a difference for computation time 
than the non-linear constraints for computing F . The computation times do not appear to depend strongly on the number 
m of preference inputs, with the partial exception of the F relation.
89
M. Montazery and N. Wilson International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 128 (2021) 69–101
Table 4
A comparison, between the running time for finding possibly optimal elements and 
undominated elements among 100 alternatives with regard to preference relations 
C , I,F , I and F . The last row includes the mean of values of each column, 
rounded to the nearest integer.
POS (A) Time (s) UNDS (A) Time (s)
C I, F I F C I, F I F
Ridesharing Database
1. 31 53 18 66 215 187 97 128
2. 41 39 22 505 152 46 24 516
3. 37 103 17 234 176 241 43 570
4. 7 11 13 29 9 18 10 870
5. 13 29 22 572 124 166 68 1710
6. 17 22 21 277 32 53 29 1723
7. 11 14 17 86 24 32 21 259
8. 13 16 8 334 42 20 12 243
9. 26 34 9 405 162 42 23 1729
10. 27 31 14 654 151 136 25 1147
11. 15 27 13 412 51 48 33 1835
12. 41 23 14 330 272 46 22 558
13. 27 24 19 539 68 46 29 2087
Mean 24 33 16 342 114 83 34 1029
Car Preference Database
1. 14 62 21 226 37 88 19 471
2. 10 47 8 185 25 38 11 870
3. 18 33 13 407 51 91 53 2344
4. 10 51 15 338 19 42 13 2126
5. 22 35 17 603 43 156 33 1535
6. 11 30 13 40 35 44 53 367
7. 12 48 20 98 63 63 55 275
8. 10 52 10 294 20 22 8 415
9. 10 24 13 55 22 50 6 72
10. 7 34 10 149 26 41 9 374
Mean 12 42 14 240 34 64 26 885
9.2. Optimal elements
The next phase of experiments is devoted to finding optimal solutions with respect to the two kinds of optimality 
operator discussed in Section 8. To do so, a set of 100 alternatives (i.e., the set A) is randomly generated, based on a 
uniform distribution for each feature. Then, for each relation, the number of possibly optimal and undominated elements 
in A is counted; see Table 3. The numbers in the I ∩ F columns relate to the intersection of the I and F optimality sets; for 
example, the left-hand I ∩ F column gives the cardinalities of the sets POSI() ∩ POSF() .
The results in Table 3 illustrate the following connections, stated in Proposition 29, between the different Possibly 
Optimal sets: POSF()(A) ∪ POSI()(A) = POSI()∪SF()(A) ⊆ POSIF()(A) ⊆ POSC()(A). Although it is not given explicitly in Ta-
ble 3, we can compute |POSI()∪SF()(A)| using |POSI()∪SF()(A)| = |POSF()(A) ∪ POSI()(A)| = |POSF()(A)| + |POSI()(A)| −
|POSF()(A) ∩ POSI()(A)|. This implies that in nine of the Ridesharing benchmarks and in all of the Car Preference bench-
marks, POSIF()(A) is a strict superset of POSI()∪SF()(A).
The results also show that others of the subset relations can easily be strict. For example, with the first Rideshar-
ing benchmark, POSF()(A) ∩ POSI()(A)  POSF()(A)  POSI()∪SF()(A)  POSIF()(A)  POSC()(A), and similarly, with 
POSI()(A) replacing POSF()(A).
In most of the benchmarks the figure in the I ∩ F column for the POS (A) case is equal to the corresponding value in the 
F column, which implies that POSF()(A) is then a subset of POSI()(A), and similarly, for the UNDS (A) results. However, the 
bold numbers show that the F and I ∩ F columns are not identical, and thus illustrate that e.g., POSF()(A) is not necessarily 
a subset of POSI()(A).
One can sometimes obtain a still smaller set than that related to SF() by taking the intersection of the optimality sets 
for SI() and SF(). For the Possibly Optimal case, this set POSI() ∩ POSF() is guaranteed to be non-empty, by Proposi-
tion 29 (because it contains the non-empty set PO{ω}(A)).
In the ridesharing database, it can be seen that for the most conservative relation, C , the optimality operators return a 
substantial proportion of alternatives as optimal solutions (roughly half for UNDS(A)).
The results for SIF() (invariant to preference inputs and features rescaling), the most robust of the three rescaling 
approaches, lead to only slightly more optimal solutions than for SI(). Also, for the ridesharing benchmarks, the POS (A)
sets tend to be substantially smaller than the corresponding UNDS (A) sets. However, the number of undominated elements 
for the car preference database is fairly similar to the number of possibly optimal elements, and we sometimes even have 
|POS (A)| > |UNDS(A)| (see the encircled numbers).
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Table 4 shows the time for finding possibly optimal and undominated solutions, where the former is faster than the lat-
ter by a factor ranging from 1.5 to 4.8 on average; this is partly because of |POS(A)| being usually smaller than |UNDS(A)|
particularly for the ridesharing database. Because the computation of F was very much slower than the other relations, 
the times in the F columns are still greatest, despite the number of optimal solutions being smaller. Overall, the computa-
tional cost of the relation F may make it less useful, even though it is more decisive, and thus leads to smaller sets of 
optimal solutions. Instead one might, for instance, favour POSI() , POSIF() and UNDSI() since they generate reasonably sized 
optimality sets much faster. Recall that each one of the returned solutions in a Possibly Optimal set is an optimal solution 
to a rescaled version of the original problem; it thus seems natural for it to be available for consideration by the decision 
maker.
10. Summary and discussion
The maximum margin method for preference learning learns a utility function from a set of input preferences, in order 
to predict further preferences. However, in many situations, it can be argued that the scaling of preference inputs should not 
affect the induced preference relation. We have defined a relation I that is a more robust version of the maximum margin 
preference inference mm , and which is invariant to the scaling of preference inputs. It is also reasonable to consider invari-
ance to the way that features are scaled because, in maximum margin inference, features should be scaled before applying 
the method; this is due to the fact that the objective function in maximum margin method is sensitive to the scale of fea-
ture domains. Thus, we have also defined the F relation which is invariant to the scaling of features. With these two types 
of rescaling being complementary, it is also natural to consider both types simultaneously, leading to a further preference 
relation I,F . We derived characterisations for the relations I , F and 
I,F
 , which lead to computational procedures. We 
also characterised the situation when the maximum margin relation is insensitive to the scaling of features, i.e., F equals 
mm . We then discussed three basic approaches to restore consistency of input data. Two optimality operators—UNDS (A)
and POS (A)—have been considered to define how a set of optimal solutions can be extracted from the available alternatives. 
We proposed two algorithms in order to compute UNDS (A) and POS(A) in an incremental manner. Our experiments, which 
used 23 benchmarks derived from two sets of real preference data, compared the different relations in terms of decisiveness 
and the set of optimal solutions regarding UNDS(A) and POS (A), and showed that the computational methods are practi-
cally feasible for a moderate number of instances/features. The relation associated with only scaling the features was the 
most decisive but by far the slowest for computing the associated optimality classes. Overall, one might consider I as a 
relation that keeps quite a good balance between decisiveness and computation time.
In the future, it would be interesting to explore extensions of our approaches including (i) integration of the approach 
with a conversational recommender system, and with a multi-criteria decision-making system; (ii) developing computational 
methods for certain kinds of kernel; (iii) considering soft margin optimisation, i.e., more sophisticated approaches for dealing 
with an inconsistent dataset; (iv) taking into account more general kinds of input preference statement; and (v) exploring 
connections with imprecise probability, based on linear constraints on probabilities.
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Appendix
The appendix includes all the proofs, of the results in the paper, that do not appear in the main body of the paper.
Results in Section 2
The proof of Proposition 1 uses Lemmas 32 and 33.
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Lemma 32. Consider any  ⊆ IRn. If > is non-empty then ∗ is the topological closure of >.
Proof. Let us write the topological closure operator as Cl(·), so that Cl(S) is the topological closure of S , which equals S
plus all the limit points of S . Basic properties of Cl(·) include: (a) S ⊆ T implies Cl(S) ⊆ Cl(T ), and (b) Cl(S) = S if S is a 
topologically closed set.
It is clear that > ⊆ ∗ which implies that Cl(>) ⊆ Cl(∗); also, Cl(∗) = ∗ since ∗ is a topologically closed set. 
We thus have Cl(>) ⊆ ∗ .
Now, we will show that ∗ ⊆ Cl(>). To do so, we will prove that for any x ∈ ∗ there is a sequence of elements of >
that converges to x. Choose arbitrary x ∈ ∗ and y ∈ > . For each λ ∈ , x ·λ ≥ 0 and y ·λ > 0, and thus, for each δ ∈ (0, 1), 
(δx + (1 − δ)y) ·λ = δ(x ·λ) + (1 − δ)(y ·λ) > 0, and so, δx + (1 − δ)y ∈ > . As δ tends to 1, δx + (1 − δ)y tends to x, showing 
that x ∈ Cl(>), as required. 
The following lemma is a well-known result for convex cones. Consider any finite  ⊆ IRn and any u ∈ IRn . Then, 
∗ ⊆ {u}∗ if and only if u ∈ co().
Lemma 33. Consider any finite  ⊆ IRn and any u ∈ IRn. Then, ∗ ⊆ {u}∗ if and only if u ∈ co().
To illustrate, u = (3, 3) is in co() in Fig. 1, and {u}∗ = {(x, y) : 3x + 3y ≥ 0} clearly contains ≥ , the union of the 
shaded regions in Fig. 1(b).
Proof. Because ∗ = (co())∗ we have that ∗ ⊆ ({u})∗ if and only if (co())∗ ⊆ (co({u}))∗ . Now, clearly, if u ∈ co()
then (co())∗ ⊆ ({u})∗ , and thus ∗ ⊆ ({u})∗ . To prove the converse, it is sufficient to show that (co())∗ ⊆ (co({u}))∗
implies u ∈ co(). Now, (co())∗ ⊆ (co({u}))∗ implies (co())∗∗ ⊇ (co({u}))∗∗ . Convex cones co() and co({u}) are both 
topologically closed (because  is finite), so, by a fundamental result for convex cones (co())∗∗ = co() and (co({u}))∗∗ =
co({u}), and thus co({u}) ⊆ co(), which implies that u ∈ co(). 
Proposition 1. Consider any finite  ⊆ IRn that is consistent (i.e., > = ∅) and consider any γ ∈ IRn. Then, the following conditions 
are equivalent. Thus, any of these are equivalent to γ C 0.
(i) for all w ∈ > , w · γ ≥ 0.
(ii) for all w ∈ ≥ , w · γ ≥ 0.
(iii) γ ∈ co().
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii): This follows immediately from ≥ ⊂ > .
(i) ⇐ (ii): Suppose that for all w ∈ ≥ , w ·γ ≥ 0, and consider any u ∈ > . Let au = minλ∈ u ·λ which is clearly greater 
than zero, and let u′ = uau . For any λ ∈ , u · λ ≥ au which implies that u′ · λ ≥ 1, and thus, u′ ∈ ≥ . Because u′ · γ ≥ 0, we 
have also, u · γ ≥ 0.
(i) ⇔ (iii): (i) means > ⊆ {γ }∗ which, because {γ }∗ is a closed set, holds if and only if Cl(>) ⊆ {γ }∗ , i.e., ∗ ⊆ {γ }∗ , 
using Lemma 32. Lemma 33 implies that this is if and only if (iii) γ ∈ co(). 
The proof of Theorem 2 uses the following lemma.
Lemma 34. For w ∈ > , define aw to be minλ∈ w · λ, (which is always strictly positive by definition of >), and define w̄ to be 
w
aw
. Then, the following hold for any w ∈ > . (i) w̄ ∈ ≥; (ii) if w ∈ ≥ then ‖w‖ > ‖w̄‖ unless w = w̄; (iii) for any real r > 0, 
marg(rw) = marg(w); (iv) marg(w) = 1‖w̄‖ .
Proof. Assume w ∈ > . Then aw̄ = minλ∈ 1aw w · λ = awaw = 1. Thus, w̄ ∈ ≥ , showing (i). Also, 
‖w‖
‖w̄‖ = aw , by definition 
of w̄ . If w ∈ ≥ then aw ≥ 1, so ‖w‖ > ‖w̄‖ unless aw = 1, i.e., w = w̄ , proving (ii). The definitions immediately imply 
that marg(w) = aw‖w‖ . Since aw̄ = 1, we have marg(w̄) = 1‖w̄‖ . The definition of marg implies that for any real r > 0, 
marg(rw) = marg(w), showing (iii), so, in particular, marg(w) = marg(w̄) = 1‖w̄‖ , which proves (iv). 
Theorem 2. Let  ⊆ IRn be a finite consistent set of preference inputs, so that > is non-empty. Then the following all hold.
(i) ≥ is non-empty;
(ii) there exists a unique element ω in 
≥ with minimum norm;
(iii) w maximises marg within > if and only if w is a strictly positive scalar multiple of ω, i.e., there exists r ∈ IR with r > 0 such 
that w = rω .
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Proof. If > is non-empty then, by Lemma 34(i), w̄ ∈ ≥ for any w ∈ > . Thus, ≥ is non-empty, showing (i). Regarding 
(ii), since ≥ is convex and topologically closed, there exists a unique element ω in ≥ with minimum norm, by a 
standard result (for a proof, see e.g., Proposition 4 of [49]).
To prove (iii), consider any w ∈ > . As we just showed, w̄ ∈ ≥ , so minimality of ω implies that ‖w̄‖ ≥ ‖ω‖ which 
equals ‖ω‖, using Lemma 34(ii). Lemma 34(iv) then implies that marg(w) ≤ marg(ω), which implies that ω max-
imises marg in > . Also, if marg(w) = marg(ω) then ‖w̄‖ = ‖ω‖, and thus, w̄ = ω by uniqueness of ω . Then 
w
aw
= ω so w is a positive scalar multiple of ω . Finally, for any r > 0, marg(rω) = marg(ω) so rω maximises 
marg in > . 
Results in Section 3.1
The following lemma and proposition are used to prove Proposition 3.
Lemma 35. Consider any finite  ⊆ IRn, any t ∈ IRm+ , any r ∈ IR+ , and any v ∈ IRn. If t′ = tr then the following results hold.
(i) v ∈ ≥t if and only if rv is in ≥t′ .
(ii) ωt′ = rωt ; i.e., v has the minimum norm in 
≥
t if and only if rv has the minimum norm in 
≥
t′ .
Proof. (i): v ∈ ≥t if and only if for all i ∈ I , v · (tiλi) ≥ 1, which is if and only if for all i ∈ I , ( tir rv) · λi ≥ 1, which holds if 
and only if for all i ∈ I , rv · (t′iλi) ≥ 1, which is iff rv ∈ ≥t′ .
(ii): v has the minimum norm in ≥t if and only if v ∈ ≥t and for all u ∈ ≥t , ‖u‖ ≥ ‖v‖. Part (i) tells us that v ∈ ≥t⇐⇒ rv ∈ ≥t′ . Now, for all u ∈ ≥t , ‖u‖ ≥ ‖v‖ holds if and only if for all u ∈ ≥t , ‖ru‖ ≥ ‖rv‖ which, from (i), is if and 
only if for all ru ∈ ≥t′ , ‖ru‖ ≥ ‖rv‖, i.e., for all u′ ∈ ≥t′ , ‖u′‖ ≥ ‖rv‖. Thus, v has the minimum norm in ≥t if and only if 
v ∈ ≥t and for all u′ ∈ ≥t′ , ‖u′‖ ≥ ‖rv‖. This holds if and only if rv has the minimum norm in ≥t′ . 
To illustrate, consider t = (3, 1, 5) and r = 5. So, t′ = (3/5, 1/5, 1). We know from Example 2 that ωt′ = (1, 2) and 
≥
t′ is 
the intersection of 6x + 3y ≥ 5 and x + 2y ≥ 5 (i.e., all the shaded region in Fig. 2(a)). It can be shown similarly that ≥t is 
the intersection of 6x + 3y ≥ 1 and x + 2y ≥ 1, leading to ωt = (1/5, 2/5) = 1r ω′t .
Proposition 36. Consider any finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn any t ∈ IRm+ , and any r ∈ IR+ . Then, if t′ = tr then 
mmt′ is equal to 
mm
t
; i.e., for any α and β ∈ IRn, α mmt′ β if and only if α mmt β .
Proof. α mmt′ β if and only if ω

t′ · α ≥ ωt′ · β which, by Lemma 35(ii), holds if and only if rωt · α ≥ rωt · β which is 
clearly if and only if α mmt β . 
Proposition 3. Consider any finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn and any α, β ∈ IRn. Then, α I β if and only if for all 
t ∈ (0, 1]m, α mmt β .
Proof. α I β iff, by definition of I , for all t ∈ IRm+ , α mmt β . This, by assigning r = maxi∈I ti in Proposition 36, holds if 
and only if for all t ∈ (0, 1]m , α mmt β . 
Results in Section 3.2
The proof of Proposition 5 uses the three lemmas below.
Lemma 37. Consider any finite  ⊆ IRn, and any t ∈ (0, 1]m. Then, for any u ∈ ≥t we have ∗ + {u} ⊆ ≥t .
To illustrate, consider t = (3/5, 1/5, 1) as in Example 2, and choose u = (1, 2). Then, ∗ + {u} is the darkly shaded region 
in Fig. 2(a). We can see in the figure that ∗ + {u} ⊆ ≥t where ≥t is all the shaded region.
Proof. For any u ∈ IRn and any v ∈ ∗ + {u}, we have, by the definition of ∗ , ∀i ∈ I, (v − u) · λi ≥ 0, which means that 
v · λi ≥ u · λi . Also, since it is assumed that u ∈ ≥t , we have ∀i ∈ I, u · λi ≥ 1/ti . Thus, ∀i ∈ I, v · λi ≥ 1/ti , and so, v ∈ ≥t . 
Lemma 38. Consider any finite  ⊆ IRn, and any u ∈ ≥ . Then, there exists t ∈ (0, 1]m such that ≥t = ∗ + {u}.
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To illustrate, consider u = (1, 2) and t = (1/4, 1/5, 1/3). Then, ≥t = {(x, y) : 24 x + 14 y ≥ 1, 15 x + 25 y ≥ 1, 13 x + 13 y ≥ 1} which 
is equal to ∗ + {u}, the darkly shaded region in Fig. 2(a).
Proof. u ∈ ≥ means that for all i ∈ I , u ·λi ≥ 1, which implies that 0 < 1u·λi ≤ 1. For all i ∈ I , let ti = 1u·λi , and so t ∈ (0, 1]m . 
By definition, w ∈ ≥t if and only if for all i ∈ I , w · tiλi ≥ 1. Now, w · tiλi ≥ 1 holds if and only if w · λi ≥ u · λi , which is if 
and only if (w − u) · λi ≥ 0. Thus, ≥t = {w ∈ IRn : ∀i ∈ I, (w − u) · λi ≥ 0}, which equals ∗ + {u}. 
Lemma 39. Consider any finite  ⊆ IRn, and any t ∈ (0, 1]m. Then, ≥t ⊆ ≥ .
Proof. Consider any u ∈ ≥t . Then for all i ∈ I , u · λi ≥ 1ti . Since each ti is in (0, 1] we have for all i ∈ I , u · λi ≥ 1, and thus, 
u ∈ ≥ . 
Proposition 5. Consider a finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn and any u ∈ IRn. Then, u ∈ SI() if and only if u ∈ ≥
and u has minimum norm in ∗ + {u}. Thus, in particular, SI() ⊆ ≥ .
Proof. ⇒: u ∈ SI() means that there exists t ∈ (0, 1]m such that u ∈ ≥t and u has the minimum norm in ≥t , which, since 

≥
t ⊆ ≥ by Lemma 39, implies that u ∈ ≥ . Now, u also has the minimum norm in ∗ +{u} because firstly, ∗ +{u} ⊆ ≥t
from Lemma 37, and secondly, u is clearly in ∗ + {u} since 0 ∈ ∗ .
⇐: Assume now that u ∈ ≥ and u has the minimum norm in ∗ + {u}. By Lemma 38, there exists t ∈ (0, 1]m such that 
u has the minimum norm in ≥t (= ∗ + {u}), and clearly u ∈ ≥t . Thus, u ∈ SI(). 
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 6; it states a basic property of a minimal norm element in a 
convex set.
Lemma 40. Consider any u ∈ G where G ⊆ IRn is a convex set. Then, u has the minimum norm in G if and only if for all v ∈ G, 
u · (v − u) ≥ 0.
Proof. ⇒: Firstly, for the case when v = u, the result is easily obtained because u · (v − u) = 0. Now, consider any v ∈
G − {u}. We define vδ = δv + (1 − δ)u for each δ ∈ (0, 1]. It is clear that vδ ∈ G because v and u both are in the convex set 
G , and since u has the minimum norm in G , for all δ ∈ (0, 1] we have that ‖vδ‖ ≥ ‖u‖. Now, assume that u · (v − u) < 0. 
We show that this assumption leads to ‖vδ‖ < ‖u‖ for some δ ∈ (0, 1], which will prove the first part by contradiction. To 
do this, we rewrite ‖vδ‖2 − ‖u‖2 as follows:
‖vδ‖2 − ‖u‖2 = ‖δ(v − u) + u)‖2 − ‖u‖2
= (δ(v − u) + u)) · (δ(v − u) + u)) − u · u,
which equals δ2(v − u) · (v − u) + 2δu · (v − u), i.e., δ(δ‖v − u‖2 + 2u · (v − u)). Now, since u · (v − u) < 0, for sufficiently 
small δ, ‖vδ‖2 − ‖u‖2 < 0, and thus ‖vδ‖ < ‖u‖.
⇐: Consider any v ∈ G −{u}. Since u = v , ‖v − u‖2 > 0, which implies that (v − u) · (v − u) > 0, and thus, ‖v‖2 +‖u‖2 >
2v · u. Also, u · (v − u) ≥ 0 leads to v · u ≥ ‖u‖2. Hence, ‖v‖2 + ‖u‖2 > 2‖u‖2, and thus, ‖v‖ > ‖u‖, showing that u has 
minimum norm in G . 
Proposition 6. Consider any finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn and any u ∈ IRn. Then, u has minimum norm in ∗ +{u}
if and only if u ∈ co().
Proof. Clearly, ∗ + {u} is a convex set. Lemma 40 implies that u has minimum norm in ∗ + {u} if and only if for all 
v ∈ ∗ + {u}, u · (v − u) ≥ 0. By writing y = v − u, this is if and only if for all y ∈ ∗ , u · y ≥ 0, which holds if and only 
if for all y ∈ ∗ , y ∈ {u}∗ . Thus, u has minimum norm in ∗ + {u} if and only if ∗ ⊆ {u}∗ . Lemma 33 then implies the 
result. 
Results in Section 4.1
The following lemma is used to prove the equivalence in Proposition 11.
Lemma 41. Consider any v ∈ IRn and any τ ∈ IRn+ . Then, v ∈ ≥ if and only if v 
 τ−1 ∈ ( 
 τ )≥ . Also, w = v minimises 
‖w 




M. Montazery and N. Wilson International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 128 (2021) 69–101
For example, we have seen in Example 3 that for τ = (2, 3), ω
τ = (2/13, 3/13). This lemma implies that for v = τ 

ω
τ = (4/13, 9/13), there is no u ∈ ≥ such that ‖u 
 τ−1‖ < ‖v 
 τ−1‖, i.e., v will be rescale-optimal in ≥ .
Proof. The first part follows easily from the definitions. Regarding the second part, by definition of ω
τ , we have that 
v = τ 
 ω
τ if and only if v 
 τ−1 has minimum norm in ( 
 τ )≥ , which is if and only if w ′ = v 
 τ−1 minimises 
‖w ′‖ over w ′ ∈ {w ′ : ∀λ ∈ , w ′ · λ 
 τ ≥ 1}. By substituting w ′ with w 
 τ−1 this holds if and only if v = w minimises 
‖w 
 τ−1‖ over w ∈ ≥ . 
Proposition 11. Consider any finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn. Then, SF() is equal to the set of all rescale-optimal 
elements of ≥ . Thus, for α, β ∈ IRn, α F β if and only if w · (α − β) ≥ 0 for every rescale-optimal element w in ≥ .
Proof. Consider any u ∈ IRn . Then, u is rescale-optimal in ≥ if and only if there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that u = w minimises 
‖w 
 τ‖ over w ∈ ≥ , which, by Lemma 41, is if and only if there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that u = τ−1 
 ω
τ−1 , which is, 
from the definition of SF(), if and only if u ∈ SF(). 
Results in Section 4.3
The proof of Theorem 13 uses a triple of lemmas.
Lemma 42. Let G be a convex and (topologically) closed subset of IRn. For each strictly positive vector τ ∈ IRn+ , there exists a unique 
w ∈ G with minimum value of ‖w 
 τ‖.
Proof. It is a standard result (for a proof see e.g., Proposition 4 of [49]) that there is a unique element in a convex closed 
set with minimum norm. Consider any τ ∈ IRn+ . Now, G 
τ = {w 
 τ : w ∈ G} is convex and closed so there exists a unique 
element w 
 τ ∈ G 
 τ with minimum value of ‖w 
 τ‖, so there is a unique w ∈ G with minimum value of ‖w 
 τ‖. 
Lemma 43. Let u, v ∈ IRn. There exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that |u(k)| < |v(k)| if and only if there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that ‖u 
 τ‖ <‖v 
 τ‖. Thus, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, |u( j)| ≥ |v( j)| if and only if for all τ ∈ IRn+ , ‖u 
 τ‖ ≥ ‖v 
 τ‖.
Proof. ⇒: Assume first that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that |u(k)| < |v(k)|. For ε > 0, define τε ∈ IRn+ by τε(k) = 1 + ε , 
and, for j = k, τε( j) = ε . Then u 
 τε = εu + u(k)ek , where ek is the unit vector in the kth direction, which leads to 
‖u 
 τε‖2 = (u 
 τε) · (u 
 τε) equalling ε2u · u + (1 + 2ε)u(k)2. Similarly, ‖v 
 τε‖2 = ε2 v · v + (1 + 2ε)v(k)2. Since u(k)2 <
v(k)2, for sufficiently small ε > 0, we will have ‖u 
 τε‖2 < ‖v 
 τε‖2.
⇐: Now assume that there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that ‖u 
 τ‖ < ‖v 
 τ‖. Then for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, |(u 
 τ )(k)| <|(v 
 τ )(k)|, i.e., |u(k)τ (k)| < |v(k)τ (k)|, which implies |u(k)| < |v(k)|, since τ (k) is non-zero. 
Lemma 15. Let G be a convex subset of IRn, and let j be any element of {1, . . . ,n}. Then either (i) there exists w ∈ G such that 
w( j) = 0; or (ii) for all w ∈ G, w( j) > 0; or (iii) for all w ∈ G, w( j) < 0.
Proof. To prove a contradiction, suppose that neither (i), (ii) nor (iii) hold for j, so for all w ∈ G , w( j) = 0, and there 
exists u, v ∈ G such that u( j) > 0 and v( j) < 0. Let δ = u( j)u( j)−v( j) , so that 1 − δ = −v( j)u( j)−v( j) . Let vδ = δv + (1 − δ)u, which 
is in G because G is convex and δ ∈ (0, 1). Then, vδ( j) = 0, which shows that (i) holds for j, contradicting the earlier 
assumption. 
Theorem 13. Let G be a convex and closed subset of IRn, and let u be an element of G. Then the following conditions are equivalent.
(i) u is uniquely rescale-optimal in G, i.e., u is the unique element of G that is rescale-optimal;
(ii) for all v ∈ G, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, |v( j)| ≥ |u( j)|;
(iii) u pointwise dominates every element in G − {u}.
Proof. First suppose (i), that u is uniquely rescale-optimal in G , so that, for all τ ∈ IRn+ , and for all v ∈ G − {u}, ‖u 
 τ‖ ≤‖v 
 τ‖; thus, by Lemma 43, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, |u( j)| ≤ |v( j)|, showing that (ii) holds. The converse follows easily: if (ii) 
holds then for all τ ∈ IRn+ , for all v ∈ G , ‖u 
 τ‖ ≤ ‖v 
 τ‖, which by Lemma 42, leads to for all τ ∈ IRn+ , for all v ∈ G − {u}, ‖u 
 τ‖ < ‖v 
 τ |‖, and thus proving (i).
We will next show that (ii) implies (iii). Consider any j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. We must show that for each v ∈ G − {u}, either 
0 ≤ u( j) ≤ v( j) or 0 ≥ u( j) ≥ v( j) hold. This holds trivially if u( j) = 0, so suppose u( j) = 0. Then, (ii) implies that, for all 
v ∈ G , v( j) = 0, and thus, by Lemma 15, either, for all v ∈ G , v( j) > 0, or for all v ∈ G , v( j) < 0. (ii) then implies that for 
all v ∈ G , either 0 ≤ u( j) ≤ v( j) or 0 ≥ u( j) ≥ v( j), proving (iii). It immediately follows that (iii) implies (ii), completing the 
proof of equivalence of (i), (ii) and (iii). 
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Results in Section 4.4
The definitions easily imply the following lemma, which relates pointwise dominance and zm-pointwise dominance.
Lemma 44. Consider any u, v ∈ IRn. If v pointwise dominates u then v zm-pointwise dominates u.
Now suppose that u ∈ G ⊆ IRn. If u is zm-pointwise undominated in G then u is pointwise undominated in G. In addition, the 
converse holds if none of the components of u is zero.
Proof. Suppose that v pointwise dominates u. Then, u = v and for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, either (i) 0 ≤ v( j) ≤ u( j), or (ii) 
0 ≥ v( j) ≥ u( j). So, for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, u(k) = v(k), which implies that u(k) = 0. This implies that v zm-pointwise 
dominates u. The other two parts follow immediately from the definitions. 
Lemma 45 below characterises the zm-pointwise undominated elements in a convex set.
Lemma 45. Consider any convex set G ∈ IRn. Then, u is zm-pointwise undominated in convex G if and only if for all v ∈ G, either
(i) v( j) = u( j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that u( j) = 0; or
(ii) there exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that either 0 < u(k) < v(k) or 0 > u(k) > v(k).
Proof. First, let us suppose that u is not zm-pointwise undominated in G . We will show that there exists v ∈ G such that 
neither condition (i) nor condition (ii) hold for v . Since u is not zm-pointwise undominated in G , there exists v ∈ G that 
zm-pointwise dominates u. By definition, there exists j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that v( j) = u( j) = 0, and thus, condition (i) does 
not hold for v; also for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} with u(k) = 0, either 0 ≤ v(k) ≤ u(k) or 0 ≥ v(k) ≥ u(k), which means that condition 
(ii) in this lemma does not hold for v .
Conversely, suppose that it is not the case that for all v ∈ G , either (i) v( j) = u( j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that u( j) = 0; 
or (ii) there exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that either 0 < u(k) < v(k) or 0 > u(k) > v(k). Then, there exists v ∈ G such that (i) 
there exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that u(k) = 0 and u(k) = v(k); and (ii) for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, if u( j) > 0 then v( j) ≤ u( j); 
and if u( j) < 0 then v( j) ≥ u( j). Thus, there exists v ∈ G such that (i) there exists k ∈ Nu such that u(k) = v(k); and (ii) 
for all j ∈ Nu , if u( j) > 0 then v( j) ≤ u( j); and if u( j) < 0 then v( j) ≥ u( j) (where Nu = { j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} : u( j) = 0}, as in 
Definition 9). For δ ∈ (0, 1] let vδ = δv + (1 − δ)u, which is in G . Then there exists δ ∈ (0, 1] such that (i) there exists k ∈ Nu
such that u(k) = vδ(k); and (ii) for all j ∈ Nu , if u( j) > 0 then 0 < vδ( j) ≤ u( j); and if u( j) < 0 then 0 > vδ( j) ≥ u( j). Thus, 
vδ zm-pointwise dominates u showing that u is not pointwise undominated in G . 
Lemma 46 is used in the proof of Proposition 16.
Lemma 46. Let u, v ∈ IRn, with u = v, and let τ ∈ IRn+ . For δ ∈ (0, 1] let vδ = δv + (1 − δ)u. Then the following hold:
(i) For any δ ∈ (0, 1], ‖vδ 
 τ‖2 − ‖u 
 τ‖2 = δ2‖(v − u) 
 τ‖2 + 2δ(τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u).
(ii) (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u) ≥ 0 if and only if for all δ ∈ (0, 1], ‖vδ 
 τ‖ > ‖u 
 τ‖.
(iii) There exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u) ≥ 0 if and only if either (a) v( j) = u( j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that 
u( j) = 0; or (b) there exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that either 0 < u(k) < v(k) or 0 > u(k) > v(k).
Proof. (i): Using vδ = u + δ(v − u), we have that vδ 
 τ = (u 
 τ ) + δ(v − u) 
 τ . Then, ‖vδ 
 τ‖2 = (vδ 
 τ ) · (vδ 
 τ ) =
(u 
 τ ) · (u 
 τ ) + δ2‖(v − u) 
 τ‖2 + 2δ(u 
 τ ) · ((v − u) 
 τ ), which leads to the result.
(ii): If (τ 
τ 
u) · (v −u) ≥ 0 then (i) immediately implies that for all δ ∈ (0, 1], ‖vδ 
 τ‖ > ‖u 
 τ‖, since ‖(v − u) 
 τ‖
is non-zero (because u = v). Conversely, suppose that (τ 
 τ 




 u) · (v − u) gives, using (i), that ‖vδ 
 τ‖ ≤ ‖u 
 τ‖, proving (ii).
(iii), ⇒: Suppose that there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u) ≥ 0, and it is not the case that there exists 
k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that either 0 < u(k) < v(k) or 0 > u(k) > v(k). Then, we can see that for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, (τ 
 τ 

u)( j)(v − u)( j) = τ ( j)2u( j)(v( j) − u( j)) ≤ 0 (since it clearly holds if u( j) = 0; if u( j) > 0 then v( j) ≤ u( j) so it also holds; 
if u( j) < 0 then v( j) ≥ u( j) so it holds then too). The sum (over each j) of these n terms is at least zero, since it is equal 
to (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u) and thus, for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, (τ 
 τ 
 u)( j)(v − u)( j) = 0. This implies that v( j) = u( j) for all 
j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that u( j) = 0.
⇐: If (a) v( j) = u( j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that u( j) = 0 then (τ 
τ 
u) ·(v −u) ≥ 0. Now, assume that (b) holds, i.e., 
there exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that either 0 < u(k) < v(k) or 0 > u(k) > v(k). For ε > 0, define τε by τε(k) =
√
1 + ε , and 
τε( j) = √ε for all j = k. Then, τε 
 τε 
 u = u(k)ek + εu, where ek is the unit vector in the kth direction, so (τε 
 τε 
 u) ·
(v − u) = u(k)(v(k) − u(k)) + εu · (v − u), which is greater than zero for sufficiently small ε , since u(k)(v(k) − u(k)) > 0. 
Proposition 16. Let u be an element of convex G ⊆ IRn. Then:
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(i) u is rescale-optimal in G if and only if there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that for all v ∈ G, (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u) ≥ 0 (i.e., (τ 
 u) · (τ 

(v − u)) ≥ 0).
(ii) u is zm-pointwise undominated in G if and only if for all v ∈ G, there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u) ≥ 0.
(iii) If u is rescale-optimal in G then u is zm-pointwise undominated in G.
Proof. (i): Using Lemma 42, u is rescale-optimal in G if and only if there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that for all v ∈ G − {u}, ‖v 
 τ‖ > ‖u 
 τ‖, which, since G is convex, is if and only if, there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that for all v ∈ G − {u} and for all 
δ ∈ (0, 1], ‖vδ 
 τ‖ > ‖u 
 τ‖, where vδ = δv + (1 − δ)u. By Lemma 46(ii), this is if and only if there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such 
that for all v ∈ G − {u}, (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u) ≥ 0, which holds if and only if there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that for all v ∈ G , 
(τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u) ≥ 0.
(ii) By Lemma 45 and Lemma 46(iii), u is zm-pointwise undominated in G if and only if for all v ∈ G − {u}, there exists 
τ ∈ IRn+ such that (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u) ≥ 0, from which (ii) follows.
(iii) follows immediately from (i) and (ii). 
Results in Section 4.5
The following lemmas are used in the proof of Theorem 18.
Lemma 47. Consider any u ∈ G I and any v ∈ G Ju . Then there exists δ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ with 0 < δ ≤ δ′ , δv + (1 − δ)u ∈ G I .
To illustrate, consider u = (1, 0) and v = (−1, 2) which is in G Ju . We can see in Fig. 1(b) that the line segment from u
to (0, 1) is in G I but beyond that from (0, 1) to v is not. That means that choosing δ′ = 1/2 works for this case (because 
1
2 v + (1 − 12 )u = (0, 1)); i.e., for all δ with 0 < δ ≤ 1/2, δv + (1 − δ)u ∈ G I .
Proof. Let x = v − u, and, for all δ ∈ (0, 1), let vδ = u + δx = δv + (1 − δ)u. Since u, v ∈ G Ju , we have vδ ∈ G Ju for all 
δ ∈ (0, 1). We will next show that for all sufficiently small δ, vδ ∈ G I , i.e., that for all i ∈ I , vδ · λi ≥ ai . Since, vδ ∈ G Ju , this 
holds for all i ∈ Ju . Now, consider any i ∈ I − Ju . By definition of Ju we have u · λi > ai . This implies that there exists δi > 0
with for all δ with 0 < δ ≤ δi , (u · λi) + δ(x · λi) > ai , and thus vδ · λi > ai . Let us choose δ′ = min {δi : i ∈ I − Ju}. Then for all 
δ with 0 < δ ≤ δ′ , and for all i ∈ I − Ju , vδ · λi > ai , so for all i ∈ I , vδ · λi ≥ ai , which shows that vδ ∈ G I . 
Lemma 48. Consider non-zero u ∈ G I (as defined above). Then u is zm-pointwise undominated in G I if and only if u is zm-pointwise 
undominated in G Ju .
Proof. ⇒: Suppose that u is zm-pointwise undominated in G I . Consider any v ∈ G Ju . By Lemma 47, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1)
such that vδ ∈ G I , where vδ = δv + (1 − δ)u = u + δ(v − u). Proposition 16(ii) implies that there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that for 
all w ∈ G I , (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (w − u) ≥ 0. In particular, (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (vδ − u) ≥ 0, i.e., (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (δ(v − u)) ≥ 0, which implies 
that (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u) ≥ 0. Note that δ does not depend on the choice of v . Thus, there exists τ ∈ IRn+ such that for all 
v ∈ G Ju , (τ 
 τ 
 u) · (v − u) ≥ 0. Applying Proposition 16(ii) again gives that u is zm-pointwise undominated in G Ju .⇐: This is immediate because G I ⊆ G Ju . 
Lemma 19. G Ju + {−u} is equal to {λi : i ∈ Ju}∗ .
G Ju +{−u} means translating G Ju to move u to the origin. So, continuing the example, for u = (1, 0), G Ju +{−u} = {w ∈
IR2 : w · (1, 1) ≥ 0, w · (1, 2) ≥ 0} = {(1, 1), (1, 2)}∗ = {λi : i ∈ Ju}∗ .
Proof. v ∈ G Ju + {−u} if and only if for all i ∈ Ju , (v + u) · λi ≥ ai , which is if and only if for all i ∈ Ju , v · λi ≥ 0 (since, by 
definition, u · λi = ai for all i ∈ Ju), which is if and only if v ∈ ({λi : i ∈ Ju})∗ . 
Lemma 49. For u, v ∈ IRn, if u and v agree on signs and u = 0 then u · v > 0.
Proof. Because u = 0, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} with u(k) = 0. Then, since u and v agree on signs, v(k) is non-zero and the 
same sign as u(k), so u(k)v(k) > 0. Also, for any j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, u( j)v( j) ≥ 0, and thus, u · v > 0. 
Theorem 18. Let u be an element of polyhedron G ⊆ IRn. Then, u is rescale-optimal in G if and only if u is zm-pointwise undominated 
in G.
Proof. G is a polyhedron, so, by definition, it can be written as {w ∈ IRn : ∀i ∈ I, w ·λi ≥ ai}. Let Ju = {i ∈ I : λi ·u = ai}, and 
let G Ju = {w ∈ IRn : ∀i ∈ Ju, w · λi ≥ ai}. Proposition 16(iii) implies that if u is rescale-optimal in G then u is zm-pointwise 
undominated. We next prove the converse.
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Assume that u is zm-pointwise undominated in G . Let C = G Ju + {−u}. By Lemma 19, C = {λi : i ∈ Ju}∗ , which is a 
polyhedral cone (i.e., a polyhedron that is cone), and thus, by the Minkowski-Weyl theorem (see e.g., Theorem 4.18 of [57]), 
is a finitely generated convex cone, so we can write C = co(W ) for some finite set W = {w1, . . . , wl}.
Let C ′ = co(S) be the convex cone generated by S = W ∪ S Z where S Z = {e j,−e j : j ∈ Z}, and e j ∈ IRn is the unit 
vector in the jth dimension, and Z = { j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} : u( j) = 0}. Also, let T = E+ ∪ E− ∪ R , where E+ = {−e j : u( j) > 0}, and 
E− = {e j : u( j) < 0}, and R = {−wi : i ∈ M}, and where M = {i ∈ L : −wi /∈ C ′} and L = {1, . . . , l}. Let H be the convex hull 
of T .
We will show that the assumption that u is zm-pointwise undominated implies that C ′ and H are disjoint. If there exists 
h ∈ C ′ ∩ H then h can be written as w + v0 where w ∈ C and v0 ∈ co(S Z ). Also, since h ∈ H , it can be written as v+ + v− + y, 
where v+ ∈ co(E+), v− ∈ co(E−) and y ∈ co(R). (More specifically, for some q1, q2, q3 ∈ [0,1 ] with q1 +q2 +q3 = 1 we have 
v+ = q1 v ′+ for some v ′+ in the convex hull of E+ , and v− = q2 v ′− for some v ′− in the convex hull of E− , and y = q3z for 
some z in the convex hull of R .) Since −y ∈ C , w − y ∈ C . Let v = w − y + u = −v0 + v+ + v− + u. Then v ∈ G Ju , because 
v − u = w − y ∈ C .
For j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, if u( j) > 0 then v0( j) = v−( j) = 0, so v( j) = u( j) + v+( j) ≤ u( j). Similarly, if u( j) < 0 then 
v( j) = u( j) + v−( j) ≥ u( j). Thus, if u( j) > 0 then v( j) ≤ u( j); and if u( j) < 0 then v( j) ≥ u( j). Since, u is zm-pointwise un-
dominated in G , u is zm-pointwise undominated in G Ju , by Lemma 48. Lemma 45 then implies that for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, if 
u( j) = 0 then v( j) = u( j), and thus v+( j) = v−( j) = 0, and so, v+ = v− = 0 (since also, if u( j) = 0 then v+( j) = v−( j) = 0, 
by definition of v+ and v− , and of E+ and E−). This implies that w + v0 = y and y ∈ H . Also, since 0 is neither in the 
convex hull of E+ nor E− , we have q1 = q2 = 0, and thus q3 = 1, and so, y is in the convex hull of R . By definition of convex 
hull, we can write y as 
∑
i∈M ti(−wi), with each ti ≥ 0, and for some k ∈ M , tk > 0. Then −tk wk = w +
∑
i∈M,i =k ti wi + v0. 
The right-hand-side is in co(S), which equals C ′ , which implies that −wk ∈ C ′ , which contradicts k ∈ M . Thus, C ′ and H are 
disjoint.
Both C ′ and H are convex and closed, and H is compact. A strict separating hyperplane theorem (see e.g., Theorem 2.1.5 
of [58]) implies that there exists vector μ ∈ IRn and c ∈ IR such that for all g ∈ C ′ , μ · g > c and for all h ∈ H , μ ·h < c. Since 
0 ∈ C ′ , we have μ · 0 > c, so c < 0.
Now, if g and −g are both in C ′ then μ · g = 0. (Else μ · g < 0 or μ · (−g) < 0; without loss of generality assume 
μ · g < 0; then there exists r > 0 such that μ · (rg) = r(μ · g) < c, which contradicts rg ∈ C ′ .) This implies that if u( j) = 0
(so j ∈ Z and e j, −e j ∈ C ′) then μ · e j = 0 and thus μ( j) = 0. Also, if i ∈ L − M , then wi, −wi ∈ C ′ , so μ · wi = 0. For any 
i ∈ M , we have that −wi ∈ H , so μ · (−wi) < c < 0, so μ · wi > 0. Thus for any wi ∈ W , μ · wi ≥ 0, and therefore for any 
w ∈ C , μ · w ≥ 0, since w is a positive linear combination of the elements of W .
If u( j) > 0, then −e j ∈ H , so μ · e j > −c > 0, so μ( j) > 0. Similarly, if u( j) < 0 then μ( j) < 0. Thus, μ agrees on signs 
with u. This, by using Lemma 49, implies that μ · u > 0 (since u = 0), and we let μ′ = μμ·u . So μ′ · u = 1, and μ′ agrees on 
signs with μ and then u too.
For any v ∈ G , v ∈ G Ju , and so v − u is in C ; we have shown that μ′ · (v − u) ≥ 0, so μ′ · v ≥ μ′ · u = 1. Theorem 17 then 
implies that u is rescale-optimal in G . 
Results in Section 4.6
Lemma 20. Consider a polyhedron G I and non-zero u ∈ G I . Then u is rescale-optimal in G I if and only if u is rescale-optimal in G Ju .
This follows from Theorem 18 and Lemma 48, since G I and G Ju are polyhedra. However, we give a more direct proof 
here.
Proof. Firstly, since G I ⊆ G Ju , if u is rescale-optimal in G Ju then u is rescale-optimal in G I (since the same scaling function 
τ can be used). We will go on to prove the converse; so, let us assume that u is rescale-optimal in G I . Theorem 17 implies 
that there exists μ ∈ IRn agreeing on signs with u such that μ · u = 1 and for all w ∈ G I , μ · w ≥ 1. Consider arbitrary 
v ∈ G Ju ; we will show that μ · v ≥ 1.
Let x = v −u, and, for all δ ∈ (0, 1), let vδ = δv + (1 −δ)u = u +δx. By Lemma 47, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that vδ ∈ G I . 
This implies that μ · vδ ≥ 1, so μ · u + δμ · x ≥ 1, and hence δμ · x ≥ 0 and μ · x ≥ 0, and therefore, μ · v ≥ μ · u = 1.
We have shown that for all v ∈ G Ju , μ · v ≥ 1; we also have that μ and u agree on signs and μ ·u = 1. Using Theorem 17, 
this implies that u is rescale-optimal in G Ju , as required. 
Results in Section 6
Proposition 27. Consider any finite subset  of IRn, and define μ = ∑λ∈ λ and define μ to be {λ ∈  : λ · μ > 0}. Assume that 
μ = 0. Then the following hold.
(i) μ is non-empty and consistent, i.e., (μ)> = ∅.
(ii) Let ωμ be the solution of the maximum margin approach for μ, i.e., the minimal norm element in (μ)
≥ . Then ωμ =
{λ ∈  : λ · ωμ > 0} is non-empty and consistent, and μ ⊆ ωμ ⊆ .
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Proof. (i): We will use proof by contradiction to show that μ is non-empty. Suppose the contrary, that μ = ∅. Then 
λ ·μ ≤ 0 for all λ ∈ , and so 0 ≤ μ ·μ = (∑λ∈ λ) ·μ ≤ 0 and thus, ‖μ‖ = 0 implying μ = 0, contradicting the assumption 
that μ = 0.
Because λ ·μ > 0 for any λ ∈ μ , we have μ ∈ (μ)> , and thus, μ is consistent. Then μ/‖μ‖ is in (μ)≥ , so the latter 
is non-empty.
(ii): Since ωμ ∈ (μ)≥ ⊆ (μ)> , we have ωμ ·λ > 0 for all λ ∈ μ , and so, μ ⊆ ωμ (and, by definition, ωμ ⊆ ). 
Thus, ωμ is non-empty. Also, λ · ωμ > 0 for all λ ∈ ωμ , showing that (ωμ )> is non-empty since it contains ωμ , 
and hence, ωμ is consistent. 
Results in Section 7
Proposition 28. For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn, we have the following relationships between the sets of scenarios:
ω ∈ SI() ∩ SF() and SI() ∪ SF() ⊆ SIF() ⊆ SC() = ≥ .
Let  be any of the relations mm , C , I , F and 
I,F
 . Then,  is a pre-order preserved by translation and uniform positive scaling, 
and λ  0 for all λ ∈  (where  is the strict part of ). In addition, these relations are nested in the following ways:
C ⊆ I,F ⊆ I∧F = I ∩ F , and I ∪ F ⊆ mm .
Proof. It follows immediately that for any u ∈ IRn , the relation ≥u on IRn is a total pre-order that is preserved by translation 
and uniform positive scaling. Also, if u ∈ ≥ then λ >u 0 for any λ ∈ .
Suppose that S ⊆ IRn and that S = ⋂u∈S ≥u . It follows easily that S is a pre-order (i.e., is reflexive and transitive), 
that is preserved by translation and uniform positive scaling (since all these properties are maintained by intersection). 
Furthermore, if S ⊆ ≥ then λ S 0 for any λ ∈ . Using this notation we have that C = ≥ ; I = SI(); F = SF(); 
I∧F = SI()∪SF(); I,F = SIF() , and mm = {ω} . Therefore, we have that each of these relations is a pre-order 
preserved by translation and uniform positive scaling, if  is the strict part of any of these relations then λ  0 for all 
λ ∈ .
It follows immediately from Definition 11 that SF() ⊆ SIF() (since if ti = 1 for all i then SF(t) = SF()). Theorem 25
implies that SIF() ⊆ ≥ . Also, by Theorem 7 if u ∈ SI() then u ∈ co() ∩ ≥ , which implies, by Theorem 25, that 
u ∈ SIF(), putting μ = u. Thus, SI() ⊆ SIF(). Therefore, SI() ∪ SF() ⊆ SIF() ⊆ ≥ .
Definition 4 implies that ω ∈ SI(), and Definition 6 implies that ω ∈ SF(), using τ given by τ ( j) = 1 for all j =
1, . . . , n, since then ω
τ 
 τ just equals ω . Hence, ω ∈ SI() ∩ SF()
Clearly, if S ⊆ S ′ then S ⊇ S ′ . The last part of the result then implies C ⊆ I,F ⊆ I ∩ F , and I ∪ F ⊆
mm . 
Results in Section 8
Proposition 29. For any finite non-empty set A ⊆ IRn of alternatives, and any finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn, 
POSF()(A) ∩ POSI()(A) is non-empty, and POSF()(A) ∪ POSI()(A) = POSI()∪SF()(A) ⊆ POSIF()(A) ⊆ POSC()(A).
Proof. From Proposition 28, we have ω ∈ SI() ∩ SF() and SI() ∪ SF() ⊆ SIF() ⊆ SC() = ≥ . The definition of 
POS(A) implies that POS(A) = ⋃u∈S PO{u}(A), which is always non-empty, because A is finite, and, for any subsets S and 
S ′ of IRn , POS∪S ′ (A) = POS (A) ∪ POS ′ (A), and if S ⊆ S ′ then POS (A) ⊆ POS ′(A). Putting these together gives PO{ω}(A) ⊆
POSF()(A) ∩ POSI()(A); and POSF()(A) ∪ POSI()(A) equals POSI()∪SF()(A), and also, POSI()∪SF()(A) ⊆ POSIF()(A) ⊆
POSC()(A). Since PO{ω}(A) is non-empty we have that POSF()(A) ∩ POSI()(A) is non-empty. 
Proposition 30. For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn, given any subset S of ≥ , and any finite set A (⊆ IRn) of 
alternatives, Algorithm 2 returns UNDS (A).
Proof. Let ′ be the final set . Now, α′ ∈ A − ′ implies that either α′ was not included in the current  in Stage One, 
because there exists ω with ω S α′ , or it was cut in Stage Two, because the current α strictly dominates α′ . In either case, 
there exists γ ∈ A such that γ S α′ which implies that α′ /∈ UNDS (A). We have shown that A − ′ ⊆ A − UNDS(A), and 
thus, UNDS(A) ⊆ ′ .
Conversely, suppose that α ∈ A − UNDS (A), so there exists some β ∈ A such that β S α. In fact, since A is finite and S
is transitive, there exists γ ∈ UNDS (A) such that γ S α. By the first part, γ ∈ ′ . Let us write A as {α1, . . . ,αh}, where the 
order reflects the order in which elements of A are chosen in the first for loop in the algorithm. Let i be the set  at the 
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beginning of the αi loop. For some different i and j, αi = α and α j = γ and we have α j S αi . Since ′  α j , for all k > j, 
k  α j . If j < i then i  α j , and thus, αi = α will not be included in the current , i.e., i+1 / α, and so α /∈ ′ . If i < j
then αi will be removed from  j at line 16, and so again α /∈ ′ . Thus, A − UNDS (A) ⊆ A − ′ , and hence, ′ ⊆ UNDS (A)
and ′ = UNDS (A), proving the correctness of the algorithm. 
Proposition 31. For finite consistent set of preference inputs  ⊆ IRn, given any subset S of ≥ , and any finite set A (⊆ IRn) of 
alternatives, Algorithm 3 returns POS (A).
Proof. Let ∗ be the final set , and let  be (∗)↓ , i.e., the set returned by the algorithm. If α ∈ A − then at some stage 
in the algorithm, FS (↓, α) = NULL. But FS (↓, α) = NULL implies that α /∈ POS(↓), which then implies that α /∈ POS (A), 
since ↓ ⊆ A. We have shown that A −  ⊆ A − POS (A), and thus POS(A) ⊆ .
Conversely, suppose that α ∈ , so that for some scenario u ∈ S , (α, u) is in the final set ∗ . It can be observed that at 
the end of every loop in the main algorithm, if (α, u) ∈  then for all β ∈ ↓ , α · u ≥ β · u. This is because when (α, u) is 
added to  (in either line 6 or line 19) we have u = FS (↓, α); and this condition is confirmed (see line 17) whenever a 
new element added. In particular, we therefore have that for any β ∈ , α ≥u β (i.e., α · u ≥ β · u).
Let γ be any element of A maximising γ · u, so that for all β ∈ A, γ · u ≥ β · u. Thus, γ ∈ POS (A), so, by the first part, 
γ ∈ . The fact that (α, u) is in ∗ implies that γ · u ≤ α · u, and thus γ · u = α · u. This implies that α ∈ POS (A), showing 
that  ⊆ POS (A), and hence,  = POS (A), proving the correctness of the algorithm. 
References
[1] G.N. Yannakakis, M. Maragoudakis, J. Hallam, Preference learning for cognitive modeling: a case study on entertainment preferences, IEEE Trans. Syst. 
Man Cybern., Part A, Syst. Hum. 39 (6) (2009) 1165–1175, https://doi .org /10 .1109 /TSMCA.2009 .2028152.
[2] A. Birlutiu, P. Groot, T. Heskes, Multi-task preference learning with an application to hearing aid personalization, Neurocomputing 73 (7) (2010) 
1177–1185, https://doi .org /10 .1016 /j .neucom .2009 .11.025.
[3] J. Fürnkranz, E. Hüllermeier, Preference Learning, Springer, 2010.
[4] C.J. Burges, A tutorial on support vector machines for pattern recognition, Data Min. Knowl. Discov. 2 (2) (1998) 121–167.
[5] V. Vapnik, Estimation of Dependences Based on Empirical Data: Empirical Inference Science, Springer, 2006.
[6] C. Cortes, V. Vapnik, Support-vector networks, Mach. Learn. 20 (3) (1995) 273–297.
[7] H. Kazawa, T. Hirao, E. Maeda, Order SVM: a kernel method for order learning based on generalized order statistics, Syst. Comput. Jpn. 36 (1) (2005) 
35–43, https://doi .org /10 .1002 /scj .10630.
[8] R. Herbrich, T. Graepel, K. Obermayer, Support vector learning for ordinal regression, in: International Conference on Artificial Neural Networks, 1999, 
pp. 97–102.
[9] T. Joachims, Optimizing search engines using clickthrough data, in: Proceedings of the Eighth ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge 
Discovery and Data Mining, KDD 2002, ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2002, pp. 133–142.
[10] A. Stolcke, S. Kajarekar, L. Ferrer, Nonparametric feature normalization for SVM-based speaker verification, in: Proceedings of the IEEE International 
Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2008, March 30–April 4, 2008, Caesars Palace, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, IEEE, 2008, 
pp. 1577–1580.
[11] A. Ben-Hur, J. Weston, A User’s Guide to Support Vector Machines, Humana Press, Totowa, NJ, 2010, pp. 223–239.
[12] A.K. Jain, R.C. Dubes, Algorithms for Clustering Data, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1988.
[13] S. Aksoy, R.M. Haralick, Feature normalization and likelihood-based similarity measures for image retrieval, Pattern Recognit. Lett. 22 (5) (2001) 
563–582, https://doi .org /10 .1016 /S0167 -8655(00 )00112 -4.
[14] D. Tax, R.P. Duin, Feature scaling in support vector data descriptions, in: Learning from Imbalanced Datasets, 2000, pp. 25–30.
[15] S. Greco, V. Mousseau, R. Slowinski, Multiple criteria sorting with a set of additive value functions, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 207 (3) (2010) 1455–1470, https://
doi .org /10 .1016 /j .ejor.2010 .05 .021.
[16] P. Haddawy, V. Ha, A. Restificar, B. Geisler, J. Miyamoto, Preference elicitation via theory refinement, J. Mach. Learn. Res. 4 (2003) 317–337, http://
dl .acm .org /citation .cfm ?id =945365 .945385.
[17] D. Bouyssou, Ranking methods based on valued preference relations: a characterization of the net flow method, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 60 (1) (1992) 61–67.
[18] W.W. Cohen, R.E. Schapire, Y. Singer, Learning to order things, J. Artif. Intell. Res. 10 (1) (1999) 243–270, http://dl .acm .org /citation .cfm ?id =1622859 .
1622867.
[19] W. Trabelsi, N. Wilson, D. Bridge, F. Ricci, Preference dominance reasoning for conversational recommender systems: a comparison between a compar-
ative preferences and a sum of weights approach, Int. J. Artif. Intell. Tools 20 (4) (2011) 591–616, https://doi .org /10 .1142 /S021821301100036X.
[20] P.C. Fishburn, Lexicographic orders, utilities and decision rules: a survey, Manag. Sci. 20 (11) (1974) 1442–1471.
[21] R. Kohli, K. Jedidi, Representation and inference of lexicographic preference models and their variants, Mark. Sci. 26 (3) (2007) 380–399, http://
EconPapers .repec .org /RePEc :inm :ormksc :v:26 :y:2007:i :3 :p :380 -399.
[22] E.C. Freuder, R. Heffernan, R.J. Wallace, N. Wilson, Lexicographically-ordered constraint satisfaction problems, Constraints 15 (1) (2010) 1–28.
[23] N. Wilson, A.-M. George, B. O’Sullivan, Computation and complexity of preference inference based on hierarchical models, in: Proceedings of the 24th 
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI’15, AAAI Press, 2015, pp. 3271–3277, http://dl .acm .org /citation .cfm ?id =2832581.2832705.
[24] G. Loomes, R. Sugden, Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty, Econ. J. 92 (368) (1982) 805–824.
[25] C. Boutilier, R. Patrascu, P. Poupart, D. Schuurmans, Regret-based utility elicitation in constraint-based decision problems, in: Proceedings of the Nine-
teenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 9, IJCAI 2005, Edinburgh, Scotland, 2005, pp. 929–934.
[26] D. Braziunas, C. Boutilier, Minimax regret based elicitation of generalized additive utilities, in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Conference on Uncer-
tainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2007, 2007, pp. 25–32.
[27] R.L. Keeney, H. Raiffa, D.W. Rajala, Decisions with multiple objectives: preferences and value trade-offs, IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. Syst. 9 (7) (1979) 
403, https://doi .org /10 .1109 /TSMC .1979 .4310245.
[28] P.C. Fishburn, Utility Theory for Decision Making, Wiley, 1970.
[29] R.L. Keeney, H. Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Trade-Offs, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
[30] J.S. Dyer, MAUT—multiattribute utility theory, in: Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis: State of the Art Surveys, Springer, 2005, pp. 265–292.
[31] F. Bacchus, A. Grove, Graphical models for preference and utility, in: Proceedings of the Eleventh Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 
UAI 1995, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 1995, pp. 3–10.
100
M. Montazery and N. Wilson International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 128 (2021) 69–101
[32] C. Boutilier, F. Bacchus, R.I. Brafman, UCP-networks: a directed graphical representation of conditional utilities, in: Proceedings of the Seventeenth 
Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2001, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 2001, pp. 56–64.
[33] C. Boutilier, R. Patrascu, P. Poupart, D. Schuurmans, Constraint-based optimization with the minimax decision criterion, in: Principles and Practice of 
Constraint Programming, CP 2003, Springer, 2003, pp. 168–182.
[34] D. Braziunas, C. Boutilier, Local utility elicitation in GAI models, in: Proceedings of the Twenty-First Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 
UAI 2005, AUAI Press, 2005, pp. 42–49, http://dl .acm .org /citation .cfm ?id =3020336 .3020342.
[35] C. Gonzales, P. Perny, GAI networks for utility elicitation, in: Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Represen-
tation and Reasoning, vol. 4, KR2004, 2004, pp. 224–234.
[36] E. Jacquet-Lagreze, J. Siskos, Assessing a set of additive utility functions for multicriteria decision-making, the UTA method, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 10 (2) 
(1982) 151–164, https://doi .org /10 .1016 /0377 -2217(82 )90155 -2.
[37] Y. Siskos, D. Yannacopoulos, UTASTAR: an ordinal regression method for building additive value functions, Investig. Oper. 5 (1) (1985) 39–53.
[38] G. Bous, P. Fortemps, F. Glineur, M. Pirlot, ACUTA: a novel method for eliciting additive value functions on the basis of holistic preference statements, 
Eur. J. Oper. Res. 206 (2) (2010) 435–444, https://doi .org /10 .1016 /j .ejor.2010 .03 .009.
[39] G. Bous, M. Pirlot, Learning multicriteria utility functions with random utility models, in: Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Algo-
rithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2013, Bruxelles, Belgium, November 12-14, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013, pp. 101–115.
[40] M. Grabisch, E. Raufaste, An empirical study of statistical properties of the Choquet and Sugeno integrals, IEEE Trans. Fuzzy Syst. 16 (4) (2008) 839–850.
[41] M. Grabisch, C. Labreuche, A decade of application of the Choquet and Sugeno integrals in multi-criteria decision aid, Ann. Oper. Res. 175 (1) (2010) 
247–286.
[42] N. Benabbou, P. Perny, P. Viappiani, Incremental elicitation of Choquet capacities for multicriteria choice, ranking and sorting problems, Artif. Intell. 
246 (2017) 152–180.
[43] C. Boutilier, R.I. Brafman, C. Domshlak, H.H. Hoos, D. Poole, CP-nets: a tool for reasoning with conditional ceteris paribus preference statements, J. Artif. 
Intell. Res. 21 (1) (2004) 135–191, http://dl .acm .org /citation .cfm ?id =1622467.1622473.
[44] J.T. Guerin, T.E. Allen, J. Goldsmith, Learning CP-Net Preferences Online from User Queries, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013, pp. 208–220.
[45] M. Montazery, N. Wilson, Learning user preferences in matching for ridesharing, in: Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Agents and 
Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2, ICAART, INSTICC SciTePress, 2016, pp. 63–73.
[46] M. Montazery, N. Wilson, Dominance and optimisation based on scale-invariant maximum margin preference learning, in: Proceedings of the Twenty-
Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-17, 2017, pp. 1209–1215.
[47] R. Marinescu, A. Razak, N. Wilson, Multi-objective constraint optimization with tradeoffs, in: Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on 
Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming, CP 2013, Uppsala, Sweden, September 16–20, 2013, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013, pp. 497–512.
[48] N. Wilson, M. Montazery, Preference inference through rescaling preference learning, in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference 
on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2016, AAAI Press, 2016, pp. 2203–2209, http://dl .acm .org /citation .cfm ?id =3060832 .3060929.
[49] N. Wilson, M. Montazery, Preference Inference Through Rescaling Preference Learning (extended version of IJCAI 2016 paper including proofs), Available 
at http://ucc .insight -centre .org /nwilson /RescalingProofs .pdf, 2016.
[50] M. Montazery, N. Wilson, Rescale-invariant SVM for binary classification, in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence, IJCAI-17, 2017, pp. 2501–2507.
[51] C. Niculescu, L.-E. Persson, Convex Functions and Their Applications: A Contemporary Approach, Springer Science & Business Media, 2006.
[52] N. Wilson, A. Razak, R. Marinescu, Computing possibly optimal solutions for multi-objective constraint optimisation with tradeoffs, in: Proceedings of 
the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2015, AAAI Press, 2015, pp. 815–821, http://dl .acm .org /citation .cfm ?
id =2832249 .2832362.
[53] L. Xia, V. Conitzer, Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders, in: Proceedings of the 23rd National 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2008, AAAI Press, 2008, pp. 196–201, http://dl .acm .org /citation .cfm ?id =1619995 .1620028.
[54] F. Rossi, K.B. Venable, T. Walsh, A short introduction to preferences: between artificial intelligence and social choice, Synth. Lect. Artif. Intell. Mach. 
Learn. 5 (4) (2011) 1–102, https://doi .org /10 .2200 /S00372ED1V01Y201107AIM014.
[55] N. Benabbou, P. Perny, On possibly optimal tradeoffs in multicriteria spanning tree problems, in: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on 
Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2015, Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., New York, NY, USA, 2015, pp. 322–337.
[56] E. Abbasnejad, S. Sanner, E.V. Bonilla, P. Poupart, Learning community-based preferences via Dirichlet process mixtures of Gaussian processes, in: 
Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2013, Beijing, China, August 3–9, 2013, IJCAI/AAAI, 2013, 
pp. 1213–1219, http://www.aaai .org /ocs /index .php /IJCAI /IJCAI13 /paper /view /6766.
[57] J. Gallier, Notes on convex sets, polytopes, polyhedra, combinatorial topology, Voronoi diagrams and Delaunay triangulations, preprint, arXiv:0805 .0292, 
2008.
[58] R.I. Bot, S. Grad, G. Wanka, Duality in Vector Optimization, Springer, 2009.
101
